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The security of an application’s data is an important consideration when creating 
modern applications. Users requiring secure data access undergo an explicit pre-
registration process where an electronic identity (username, X.509 certificate, etc.) and a 
method of laying claim to the identity (password, public/private key pair, etc.) are created. 
The user’s authorization data is associated with the electronic identity. However, there are 
emergent situations where a user needs to access data where previous pre-registration is 
not possible because the future need for such data is unpredictable, such as an emergency 
room physician accessing the electronic health records (EHRs) of admitted patients. A 
process is needed where users (requestors such as medical personnel) make requests to the 
resource providers (controllers such as EHRs) in such a way that trust can be established 
automatically, allowing the requestor to obtain the necessary data quickly, securely, and 
safely. 
The high-level focus of this dissertation is to present a trust negotiation framework 
that allows trust to be established with automated techniques by extending and combining 
trust negotiation and a new trust profile. Trust negotiation establishes trust by allowing a 
requestor and controller to alternate releasing secure credentials. The trust profile 
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The user chooses a subset of the trust profile and presents it to the controller during trust 
negotiation as proof that the user has been trusted to access sensitive data in the past. If the 
controller grants access to the user, the controller generates new credentials that the user 
receives and adds to the trust profile. The feasibility of this approach is demonstrated 
through a scenario in the healthcare industry, where healthcare professionals (doctors, 
nurses, insurance agents, public health officials, etc.) obtain authorization to healthcare 
data possessed by healthcare organizations, with whom there is no pre-existing 
relationship. We leverage health information exchange concepts, the Fast Healthcare 
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) standard, and the Connecticut Concussion Tracker app 
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Modern computer systems are responsible for protecting a wide variety of secure 
data resources from malicious actors while also ensuring data availability to those who are 
sanctioned to access the data. Traditionally, access to data is determined via a process 
consisting of authentication, authorization, and registration. Authentication is the process 
of determining the user’s identity. Authorization is the process assigning access rights (e.g., 
create or read a file) to the data. Registration refers to the process of generating the data 
necessary to authenticate and authorize a user. The user’s identity consists of a username, 
which forms the basis of the identity, and a secret password, which is utilized as a means 
of claiming the identity. Creation of authorization data may be automated in simple cases, 
as in the case where a user only has a need to access data they create (e.g., email). A more 
complex case may require human intervention, such as a physician accessing electronic 
healthcare records (EHRs) from the local hospital’s computer system. For this scheme to 
work, the username, password, and authorization data must be previously known to the 
computer system. The authentication process is simple and effective when it is known in 
advance that a specific user will have a need to access secure data residing in a known 
computer system. Conversely, the registration process is slow and inept when users may 
unexpectedly have a need to quickly access data from a computer system to which he/she 




(Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) provides a method for a set of user credentials to 
be released over an automated negotiation period. 
Further complicating the processes of authentication, authorization and registration 
in a domain such as healthcare is the need to support health information exchange (HIE) 
so that medical providers treating patients can securely access multiple health information 
technology (HIT) systems (e.g., electronic health records (EHRs) patient portals, e-
prescribing applications for medical providers and pharmacists, laboratory diagnostic 
systems, etc.) in both emergency and non-emergency situations to treat patients. This might 
include HIT systems to which the medical provider has not been given access previously. 
The increased interest in the secure sharing of data requires that methods for authenticating 
and authorizing users must become more sophisticated in order to support the needs of both 
the users and interactions with multiple HIT systems in the domain. The trust negotiation 
method outlined in this dissertation allows each HIT system (e.g., an EHR) to create and 
maintain its own criteria for data dissemination to users without the need for a central login 
system or pre-registration process. To support the trust negotiation process, each 
participating HIT system (for the user or the data source), must have a controller capability 
separate from that system in order to facilitate the interactions when the user without 
credentials requests access to one or more HIT systems they have not been authorized to 
use. The user in this case holds a record of each access to sensitive data, where each record 
is added to a collection that is referred to as a trust profile. This trust profile for a user 
contains records of access that have been accrued over time from multiple HIT systems 
that the user has been authorized to access. On the HIT system side of the trust negotiation 




interacting with the HIT system to decide if the requested access is allowable. When trust 
negotiation is successful, the controller creates a new entry in the trust profile for the user 
that can be utilized in future attempts to access sensitive data with any controller. Our 
proposed trust negotiation approach that is presented in this dissertation is integrated into 
the security model provided by the Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) 
(HL7 International, 2020) standard, a health information exchange (HIE) standard created 
by HL7 to promote secure sharing of healthcare data among multiple health information 
technology (HIT) systems. Figure 1.1 illustrates the components needed to attain quick, 
automated trust negotiation for the release of secure data to a legitimate user. The leftmost 
side of Figure 1.1 indicates the components utilized by the user to obtain trust, whereas the 
rightmost side indicates the server-side components that check user credentials for validity, 
determine the level of access the user will obtain if any, and securely transfer the data to 
the user. Note that the user can be any medical stakeholder such as a physician, nurse, 
pharmacist, etc. While the examples in this dissertation are heavily dominated using the 
healthcare domain, the trust profile research that is presented as captured in the orange and 
blue boxes at the bottom of Figure 1.1 can be applied to any domain that is interested in 






Figure 1.1. Interactions and Flow of Proposed Trust Negotiation Framework. 
To understand all of the different interactions of trust negotiation, we explain all of 
the different components in Figure 1.1. This includes: 
 The uppermost left corner a Figure 1.1 introduces the concept of a Medical 
Authority, which is an entity that promotes trust among the various HIT systems 
participating in trust negotiation, allowing them to trust each other’s endorsements 
of a user’s Trust Profile. The Medical Authority plays a major role in overseeing 
the process in interactions of all of the different components in trust negotiation. 
 The upper left corner of Figure 1.1 has HIT Systems that the user has accessed data 
from that are accessible via a Medical Authority that front-ends a health 




user by digitally signing the certificates that indicate the user has obtained access 
to the data listed in the Trust Profile. 
 The Trust Profile in the lower left corner of Figure 1.1, represents a collection of 
the user’s history of access to sensitive data, and includes: the User’s Trust Agent, 
an autonomous actor that manages disclosure of the user’s Trust Profile during the 
trust negotiation process; the Identity and Attribute certificates that encode the 
user’s Trust Profile and add legitimacy to the Trust Profile by allowing the data to 
be verified and endorsed by a third party (a participating HIT System); and, a 
Digital Wallet, a subset of the user’s Trust Profile that the user chooses to send with 
the request for sensitive data. The Digital Wallet is compiled by the user as an 
example of the user accessing similar sensitive data in the past. 
 The Controller’s Trust Agent in the lower right corner of Figure 1.1, is an 
autonomous actor that manages the disclosure of the controller’s credentials and 
requests credentials from the user. The controller’s Trust Negotiation component 
determines the type of credentials from the Trust Profile required to access the 
requested data, using Access Control Policies. 
 The upper right corner of Figure 1.1 represents the health records that are available 
from the Medical Authority from one of the HIT Systems. Access to the health 
records/FHIR resources are via access control policies such as role-based access 




based access control ABAC (Hu, et al., 2014), and mandatory based access control 
MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976). 
Collectively, all of these components and their interactions provide the necessary 
infrastructure to allow controllers to generate requirements for the secure dissemination of 
sensitive data, request credentials from a user’s Trust Profile, match those credentials to 
access control policies, transfer the requested data to the user, and generate new credentials 
for the user. 
 
1.1. Motivation for Healthcare 
The healthcare industry is increasingly interested in sharing healthcare data among 
medical providers (e.g., hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, public health officials, etc.) via HIE 
to enhance treatment and increase patient satisfaction (HealthIT.gov, 2014) (Kelly, 2013) 
(Mettler & Rohner, 2009). The healthcare industry is moving towards an approach to 
treatment where the patient sees a number of specialists in disparate subfields (e.g., general 
practitioners, cardiologists, oncologists, surgeons, dentists, psychiatrists, etc.) to treat a 
single patient. These healthcare professionals may not necessarily interact or know each 
other, but each must have complete access to the patient’s healthcare record to form 
effective treatments. Healthcare workers in emergent care such as ER physicians or EMTs 
have a vested interest in obtaining patient data quickly, even if the patient’s EHR data is 
located at multiple facilities. The availability of patient information across multiple HIT 
systems requires a Medical Authority that front ends a health information exchange layer 




combination is insufficient in these scenarios as the preregistration process places too much 
of a burden on system administrators, requires the compilation of identity-based credentials 
from the physicians, and requires a lengthy vetting process. While a single, monolithic 
login platform with participation from all healthcare facilities would be sufficient in 
avoiding the drawbacks caused by the preregistration process, it creates a single point of 
failure, creates an extremely visible target for criminals, and diminishes the ability of 
controllers to control the dissemination of the Protected Health Information (PHI) they are 
charged with protecting under laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2019). 
Our trust profile based trust negotiation approach allows controllers (e.g., hospitals, 
health record banks, etc.) to automate the approval of the release of patient data by allowing 
them the flexibility to define the criteria that must be met before the data is released. 
Stakeholders such as physicians, hospitals, insurance companies, or public health officials 
are allowed to build trust amongst themselves through interactions over the course of a 
professional career. Users with a high amount of trust will find it relatively easy to request 
secure data, while users with a lower amount of trust may be required by controllers to 
meet stricter requirements to ensure that patient data is not leaked. The combination of 
expandable trust profiles with trust negotiation allows increased granularity in the 
credentials a user may present during the negotiation process, thus also increasing the 
granularity of the controller’s security measures.  
The increasing presence of mobile devices within the healthcare field provides 
additional difficulties as these devices may be lost or stolen, resulting in the exposure of 




non-profit organization that assists victims of identity theft, in 2019 the healthcare sector 
was found to have had the second most data breaches at 525 (Identity Theft Resource 
Center, 2020). An estimated 80% of physicians (Lewis, 2011) rely on mobile devices to 
access patient information from EHRs. Trust negotiation provides an extra layer of security 
by ensuring that the mobile device’s user is deserving of trust. An adaptation of trust 
negotiation for mobile devices in the healthcare field was introduced in (Vawdrey, 
Sundelin, Seamons, & Knutson, 2003), which details a system for trust negotiation in 
healthcare while incorporating surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003), which 
addresses limited battery, slow computation, and unreliable networking issues in adapting 
trust negotiation to mobile devices. The possibility of patient Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) and PHI being obtained via a stolen mobile device requires additional 
security parameters to ensure that patient data is not leaked. Trust negotiation has the 
potential to alleviate this concern by placing an insurmountable hurdle towards potential 
criminals; since they have not obtained a healthcare focused trust profile, it is impossible 
for them to obtain patient data from remote hospitals even with a stolen mobile healthcare 
device. 
1.2. Motivation for Trust Profiling and Trust Negotiation 
Many modern healthcare and financial industries are heavily data-driven and 
depend on the availability of critical data while also being extremely sensitive to improper 
data disclosure. In addition, there is a need for organizations operating within these fields 
to share data with others under certain conditions. Modern healthcare in particular requires 
teams of medical and non-medical professionals to treat a single patient, and each 




treatments. Authorization data in both the healthcare and financial fields is often assigned 
manually in a slow registration process that guarantees that the data is released to the proper 
parties, but at the expense of time and the cost of needing an employee to manually perform 
the authorization. Authorizing individuals from other companies or fields may take even 
longer, as the identity and trustworthiness of the individual must be ascertained by the 
authorizer, which may slow down the process considerably.  
The concepts of trust profiling and trust negotiation have the potential to greatly 
increase the speed at which authorization occurs while also properly restricting access only 
to those who should have access to the data by automating the assignment of permissions 
on the data, even to those who have no previous relationship with the data holder. 
Additionally, traditional authorization is often only able to produce an allow/deny decision, 
where the user may only be authorized to access all the data or none of it, despite the release 
of some forms of data (e.g., patient demographic information) being far less controlled and 
potentially damaging than others (e.g., patient mental health data). More nuanced forms of 
authorization, such as those outlined in this dissertation, allow for annotation on many 
different types of data and also allow the user to retrieve requested data to which they are 
authorized, while filtering more restricted data. Our approach also allows for the controller 
to automatically determine whether data must be added (e.g., including a required library 
so the requested data can be read), modified (e.g., translating an internal data representation 
into a data interchange standard), or removed (e.g., removing mental health data from a 
patient’s EHR before transfer). 
In support of these needs, our proposed trust negotiation approach seeks to allow 




profiles (Sanzi, Demurjian, Agresta, & Murphy, November 2016) with role-based access 
control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), attribute-based 
access control (ABAC) (Hu, et al., 2014), and mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & 
La Padula, 1976). These three access control models allow us to leverage the trust 
negotiation procedure in a manner that allows for the automation of the assignment of 
permissions on data to the user and streamlines the negotiation of the release of portions of 
the user’s Trust Profile in the form of a Digital Wallet as shown in the bottom of Figure 
1.1. This Digital Wallet shown in the bottom center contains access history records that 
detail the Trust Profile owner’s previous access to secured data. Portions of this data may 
be taken as credentials in the trust negotiation process that detail properties of the data 
accessed, such as the type of data access (e.g., patient drug list, financial report, etc.) or the 
identity of the patient listed in the record. When a controller receives a request for data in 
the bottom of Figure 1.1, the user’s role in an RBAC scheme is sent along with the request 
so that the controller can ascertain the user’s reason for requesting the data. For instance, a 
physician role in the healthcare field would be expected to access individual healthcare 
records, whereas a public health official would be expected to access more general data 
across many patients with regards to trends in public health (e.g., tracking concussions 
among high school athletes). ABAC, shown in the Access Control Policies in the center-
right of Figure 1.1, allows the integration of credentials in the form of attributes from the 
Trust Profile to assist in determining whether the user has an access history that indicates 
experience and trustworthiness in handling the requested data, while also integrating MAC 




The Trust Profile also enhances the security and efficiency of mobile devices by 
providing a scheme through which the user of the device can prove that the current user is 
authorized to access data. Mobile devices are becoming increasingly popular as a 
computing platform (Gartner, March 19, 2015), yet with increased popularity comes an 
increased focus on device security as more criminals consider mobile devices to be a prime 
target for data theft (Montopoli, 2013). Lost or stolen devices have the potential to allow 
criminals the opportunity to access sensitive data if proper security safeguards are not 
utilized. Stolen mobile devices may contain many types of sensitive data including: 
banking information, personally identifiable information (PII), protected health 
information (PHI), or allow the criminal the opportunity to access business or healthcare 
services. The addition of trust profiling and trust negotiation inserts an extra layer of 
security that allows any servers the device connects to the opportunity to determine that 
the current holder is a legitimate user by checking the user’s access history. 
1.3. A High-Level View of Our Approach 
This dissertation seeks to create a method by which two entities whose identities 
are completely unknown to each other may initiate and fulfill requests for access to secure 
data or resources as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 illustrates six levels through which 
the trust negotiation process is realized, from the local EHRs at the top of Figure 1.2 
enhancing the level of trust for the user to remote HITs at the bottom of Figure 1.2 that 
users request sensitive PHI. The six levels are: Local EHR, User Devices, Trust Building, 
Trust Negotiation, Security Policies, and FHIR Resources from Remote HITs. There is a 
correspondence between the material presented in Figure 1.1 and the levels as given in 




to the Trust Building and Trust Negotiation levels in Figure 1.2 and these two levels  are 
independent of the healthcare domain and could be leveraged and other domains that are 
interested in the secure access to information in a trusted manner. The User Devices present 
in the second level in Figure 1.2 allow healthcare professionals access to the Trust Building 
tools present in the Trust Building level, as well as offering connections to local EHRs and 
the ability to view sensitive PHI once authorized. The Medical Authority promotes trust 
among the healthcare organizations (HCOs), while the HCOs promote trust in an individual 
user’s Trust Profile, allowing the user’s access to trusted credentials. The Trust Building 
tools allow the User Devices to participate in Trust Negotiation where a user exchanges 
the credentials available from the Trust Building level to negotiate the release of a patient’s 
healthcare data. The Trust Negotiation level encompasses the Credential Exchange, 
verification of the certificates through the trust building process (Profile Verification), and 
Release Actions performed if trust negotiation is successful, such as logging the 
transaction. The Security Policies level represents the security protocols that inform which 
credentials must be presented from the Trust Negotiation level to gain access to healthcare 
data provided by FHIR. The Security Policies filter the data provided by the FHIR 
Resources from Remote HITs illustrated in the bottom level in Figure 1.2 to ensure safe, 
secure sharing of sensitive healthcare data. 
 Access requests are facilitated through the Trust Negotiation level in a gradual 
exchange of increasingly sensitive credentials on the part of both the requestor and the 
controller until a mutual trust is established that: the requestor is qualified to access the 
requested resource, the requestor will handle sensitive resources in an appropriate manner, 




that mutual trust cannot be established and the request fails. The credentials include a trust 
profile, a series of access records that encompasses the requestor’s complete history of 
sensitive resource access including: when the request was made, the role the requestor held 
when the request was made, the requestor’s affiliation status with healthcare providers, the 
resource requested, the controller the resource was requested from, the confidentiality of 
the resource, and the highest sensitivity level granted to the requestor from the controller. 
The Trust Profile is displayed in the lower left corner of Figure 1.1. During trust 
negotiation, the user’s Trust Profile is gradually exchanged with the controller through the 
Digital Wallet, represented by the arrows flowing from the User Trust Agent to the 
Controller Trust Agent. The controller responds to a request for access to a resource from 
a user by using its Access Control Policies to determine the access history the user will 
need to provide through a subset of the Trust Profile to obtain access to the requested 
resource. The controller is illustrated in Figure 1.1 in the box encompassing the right side. 
The controller may also decide to take additional release actions depending on how well 
the requestor’s presented trust profile fulfill its criteria. The controller may decide to: redact 
sensitive data, add data for interpretive purposes, modify data to arrange it into the correct 
format, or perform other functions such as dispatching audit notifications. Our approach 
allows each controller to determine its own Access Control Policies, giving the healthcare 
organization full control over its data disclosure requirements. The user also has full control 
over sensitive credentials released during the trust negotiation process and may choose to 





The trust profile is encoded in a series of X.509 Identity and Attribute Certificates 
(Housley, Polk, Ford, & Solo, 2002). These certificates are permanent representations of 
the user’s access control history and are available to the user throughout his/her entire 
career. Should the user change employment, any certificates indicating current affiliation 
with the previous employer are revoked, but the history of sensitive record access may still 
be presented during trust negotiation. Each user possesses one Identity Certificate per 
controller from whom sensitive resource access has been granted. Each Identity Certificate 
may have one or more Attribute Certificates attached to it detailing the sensitive data that 
has been obtained. The Identity Certificates provide controllers with a verifiable method 
of determining that it has been presented by the owner of the trust profile by verifying 
ownership of the private key associated with the public key listed in the certificate. 
Attribute Certificates are attached to the Identity Certificates by verifying that the serial 
number and the issuer match the fields listed in the Identity Certificate. The digital 
signatures on the certificates, provided by the controller that granted access to the user, 
provide assurance that the information contained within the certificate is correct and has 
not been altered since the certificate was signed. The Trust Profile certificates may be held 
by the user in a local certificate store or stored with a Trust Agent that performs the trust 






Figure 1.2. High-Level View of Trust Profile Supported Trust Negotiation. 
The Medical Authority establishes trust between the healthcare organizations 
(HCOs) that own the HIT Systems by signing their controllers’ Certificate Authority 
certificates, allowing the HIT Systems to sign the Trust Profile certificates as displayed in 
the Trust Building level of Figure 1.2. Medical Authorities are analogous to root certificate 




symbolized by the arrow connecting medical authorities to HCOs in Figure 1.2. While 
certificate authorities are generally limited to providing assurance that the user has 
connected to the correct domain or verifying the domain owner’s legal identity, the Medical 
Authority is responsible for also providing assurance that HCOs that can create trust profile 
entries are: producing accurate records, protecting their private keys appropriately, and 
enforcing a minimum standard on data disclosure. Each controller for an HCO must 
maintain a store of certificates belonging to medical authorities whose judgement is trusted 
by the administrator. During the inspection of certificates that represent entries in the 
requestor’s Trust Profile, the digital signature on the certificates is inspected to ensure that 
the data within the certificate has not been altered. Then the certificate of the signer is 
inspected in the same manner. In most cases, this certificate will be a certificate belonging 
to another controller that the requestor has previously gained sensitive access to, with an 
entry indicating that the other controller has been authorized by a Medical Authority to 
produce Trust Profile certificates for its domain, and the Medical Authority’s digital 
signature. If this certificate is valid, the certificate of the Medical Authority is retrieved and 
is checked against the controller’s certificate store: if a matching certificate is found the 
trust profile certificates are valid. This establishes a chain of trust depicted in the Trust 
Building level of Figure 1.2. The Medical Authority establishes trust among HCOs, while 
the HCOs establish trust in each user’s trust profile through a chain of digital signatures. 
The system administrators can specify a series of requirements of the user’s history 
that prove a need to access the data, responsibility in handling similar data, and allow 
access to secure data by applying RBAC, ABAC, MAC, etc., with a granularity 




etc.), and individual entries (a single MRI scan). This functionality is represented by the 
Security Policies of Figure 1.2. For instance, an administrator can indicate that general 
patient demographic information is available to requestors possessing the nurse or 
physician roles from other hospitals if they are able to present a credential indicating that 
they are presently employed by a healthcare organization recognized by a Medical 
Authority and have accessed healthcare data annotated with the lowest security level. 
Conversely, for more sensitive information such as a patient’s complete EHR, the 
administrator can specify that: the requestor needs Trust Profile entries indicating that the 
requestor has accessed the same patient’s healthcare record from other organizations and 
the controller must report the access for review by an auditor. This additional flexibility 
allows for the sharing of potentially sensitive healthcare data with healthcare professionals 
that have a need to access sensitive healthcare data who have proven to be trustworthy in 
the past, freeing administrators from a time-consuming manual vetting of a requestor’s 
trustworthiness and allowing the release of healthcare data immediately in time-critical 
situations. 
 
1.4. Research Objectives and Expected Contributions 
The proposed solution for integrating trust negotiation and trust profiling has the 
following expected contributions. 
A. Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations 
Participating in Trust Negotiation: This contribution will define a set of infrastructure 
requirements that organizations must provide to support the ability to establish implicit 




negotiation process, represented by the Trust Building process of Figure 1.2. This trust 
between organizations forms the basis of the Trust Profile, as the organizations must be 
sure that the presented credentials in the Trust Profile are valid to make an informed 
decision as to the trustworthiness of the requestor. The left side of Figure 1.1 represents 
the trust building network and encompasses the Medial Authority for HIE via HAPI FHIR, 
each HIT system, HIE via HAPI FHIR, and the Trust Profile’s Identity and Attribute 
Certificates.  
B. Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording Complete Records of User 
Access to Sensitive Data: The contribution will include a format for the Trust Profile that 
provides the ability to record metadata describing sensitive data access and built in integrity 
checks during the Trust Negotiation level of Figure 1.2, allowing for the Trust Profile to 
be utilized as a credential with minimal communication required between participating 
organizations. These interactions occur between controllers and requestors. The model 
includes granular access control annotation of healthcare data stored in a HAPI FHIR 
server and the methods utilized to match trust profile access history data to the annotated 
FHIR data. This contribution provides the internal structure for the Identity and Attribute 
Certificates depicted on the left of Figure 1.1 and the process of exchanging Trust Profile 
credentials between the User Trust Agent and the Controller Trust Agent. 
C. Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies: This contribution is 
a combination of access control models RBAC, ABAC, and MAC that provide a method 
for organizations to utilize a set of security policies that can be dynamically adapted to the 
current request, located in the Security Policies level of Figure 1.2. Requirements for the 




of healthcare data requested, the portions of the Trust Profile released during negotiation, 
and the security annotations attached to the data resources. This contribution forms the 
structure and interactions between the Access Control Policies on the right side of Figure 
1.1. 
D. Trust Negotiation Development Framework:  Contribution D provides the 
participating organization with all of the required steps and processes that are necessary to: 
define the infrastructure in support of Contribution A; support and implement the model 
for Contribution B; and, enforce a dynamic adaptive trust negotiation process in support of 
Contribution C. This contribution defines the interactions between the various components 
in a full, trust negotiation capable HIT system depicted on the right side of Figure 1.1. 
Contribution D provides the necessary links between the Trust Negotiation, Security 
Policies, and FHIR Resources from Remote HITs level in Figure 1.2. 
 
This dissertation will examine each contribution’s relevance towards trust profiles and trust 
negotiation in the healthcare field. 
 
1.5. Research Progress to Date 
In support of the proposed trust profile based trust negotiation, we summarize our 
4 publications (4 published) and their contribution toward the dissertation: lead author 
directly related to the work are: 2 published refereed book chapters and 2 published 
refereed full conference articles; coauthor of 2 published journal articles; coauthor of 1 
published refereed book chapter; and coauthor of 1 published refereed full conference 
article. The first papers focused on the overall concept and flow of a trust profile based 




the healthcare network (Sanzi & Demurjian, Identification and Adaptive Trust Negotiation 
in Interconnected Systems, May 2016). This work was expanded with a method of adapting 
trust profiles and trust negotiation to mobile devices including: description of the contents 
and set of interactions for trust profiles stored on mobile devices during trust negotiation; 
and detailed descriptions of the exchange of credentials between the user’s mobile device, 
trust agents, and the controller; and the generation and storage of new trust profile 
credentials if the trust negotiation is successful (Sanzi, Demurjian, Agresta, & Murphy, 
November 2016). 
 Sanzi, E. and S. Demurjian, "Identification and Adaptive Trust Negotiation in 
Interconnected Systems," in Innovative Solutions for Access Control Management, 
A. Malik, A. Anjum and B. Raza, Eds., IGI Global, May 2016, pp. 33-65. 
 Sanzi, E., S. Demurjian, T. Agresta and A. Murphy, "Trust Profiling to Enable 
Adaptive Trust Negotiation in Mobile Devices," in Mobile Application 
Development, Usability, and Security, S. Mukherja, Ed., IGI Global, November 
2016, pp. 95-116. 
Building upon these trust building concepts, we defined a formal model for the trust profile 
(Sanzi, Demurjian, & Billings, Integrating Trust Profiles, Trust Negotiation, and Attribute 
Based Access Control, 2017). This formal model provides a standardized structure for the 
trust profile, including a set of standardized attribute certificate structures to describe each 
access to sensitive healthcare data and a set of attribute certificates describing overall 
sensitivity levels and local affiliation with a healthcare organization as a whole. 
 Sanzi, E., Demurjian, S., & Billings, J. (2017). Integrating Trust Profiles, Trust 




Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services, and Engineering 
(MobileCloud) (pp. 177-184). San Francisco: IEEE. 
doi:10.1109/MobileCloud.2017.30 
The next effort provides a methodology for incorporating trust profile based trust 
negotiation into the FHIR standard by providing a standard set of security objects. These 
security objects are generated based on a configuration set by a system administrator, as 
well as the patient described by the resource the security objects belong to, and adapts the 
security objects based on the user’s role and the credentials chosen from the trust profile 
by the user during trust negotiation. 
 Sanzi, E. and Demurjian, S., “Trust Profile Based Trust Negotiation for the FHIR 
Standard,” Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Data Science, 
Technologies, and Applications (DATA2020), July 2020. 
Other publications not directly related to the work are: 
  Ziminski, T., Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Baihan, M. and Agresta, T., “An 
Architectural Solution for Health Information Exchange,” republished in Virtual 
and Mobile Healthcare: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice, Information 
Resources Management Association (USA), pp. 283-327, July 2020.     
 Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Agresta, T., and Yasnoff, W., “Multi-Level Security in 
Healthcare using a Lattice-Based Access Control Model,” IGI International 
Journal of Privacy and Health Information Management (IJPHIM), Vol. 7, No. 1, 
January-June 2019, pp. 80-102, IGI Global,  
 Ziminski, T., Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., Baihan, M. and Agresta, T., “An 




User-Driven Healthcare (IJUDH), Vol 6, No. 1, pp. 65-103, November 2016, IGI 
Global, https://www.igi-global.com/article/an-architectural-solution-for-health-
information-exchange/181318 
 Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Sanzi, E., & Agresta, T. (2016). Toward 
Integrating Healthcare Data and Systems: A Study of Architectural Alternatives. In 
T. Iyamu, & A. Tatnall (Eds.), Maximizing Healthcare Delivery and Management 
through Technology Integration, pp. 270-304. IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-1-
4666-9446-0.ch016 
 Agresta, T., Demurjian, S., Sanzi, E., DeStefano, J., Ward-Charlerie, S., Rusnak, 
R., & Tran, R. (2020). A Mobile Health Application for Medication Reconciliation 
using RxNorm and FHIR. Submitted to The Fifth International Conference on 
Informatics and Assistive Technologies for Health-Care, Medical Support and 
Wellbeing (HEALTHINFO 2020). Porto, Portugal. 
 
1.6. Dissertation Outline 
The remainder of the dissertation has 6 chapters. In Chapter 2, we detail background 
on the requirements for security in the healthcare field, relevant RBAC, ABAC, and MAC 
access control models utilized to restrict information access, supporting technologies for 
trust negotiation, and the FHIR standard/HAPI server implementation for supporting the 
trust profile infrastructure. Chapter 2 also briefly presents the Connecticut Concussion 
Tracker (CT2) app that was created as the result of a new law passed in Connecticut 
(Connecticut General Assembly, 2015) requiring that concussions be tracked for kids 




A: Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations Participating in 
Trust Negotiation, which establishes how healthcare organizations and their affiliates 
connect on the network, establish communication protocols, and create a baseline of trust 
in the credentials themselves; Contribution B: Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording 
Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data by detailing the identity and attribute 
certificates that form the trust profile; and, Contribution C: Dynamically Generated 
Adaptive Access Control Policies by defining integration of access control policies into 
attribute certificates. In Chapter 4, we primarily address Contribution B: Trust Profile for 
Recording Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data by describing the 
interactions between the requestor and the data controller that allows a gradual growth in 
trust to occur. Chapter 4 also addresses Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive 
Access Control Policies, by describing how the access control policies protect the 
underlying healthcare data and establishes the relationship between the access control 
policies and the trust establishment process through a defined formal model. Contribution 
C is illustrated utilizing a mobile health (mHealth) application for concussion management 
which leverages health information exchange concepts and a RESTful API as the 
infrastructure within which are trust profiles and trust  negotiation are realized. In Chapter 
5, we address Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies 
by defining integration of access control policies with the controller and Contribution D: 
Adaptive Trust Design and Development Methodology by providing a framework for 
integrating dynamic and adaptive trust negotiation to existing healthcare services. Chapter 
6 addresses Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies 




policies to guard access to the CT2 app prototype and Contribution D: Trust Negotiation 
Development Framework by including a detailed discussion of the prototype (CT2) that has 
been developed to demonstrate unification of the trust profile concepts presented 
throughout this dissertation. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the contributions in 









This chapter describes background information necessary for the main 
contributions and supporting concepts utilized throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation. Section 2.1 has a brief overview of the state of trust and interoperability 
between healthcare systems and the standards that must be met to enable secure 
interoperability. Section 2.2 explains role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, 
Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), attribute-based access control (ABAC) 
(Hu, et al., 2014), and mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976) and their 
application to healthcare security. Section 2.3 provides a detailed explanation of the FHIR 
(HL7 International, 2020) standard and the HAPI server (HAPI FHIR, 2020) in support of 
the trust negotiation model. Section 2.4 concludes the background with a description of the 
Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) mobile app, a collaboration between the 
Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science & Engineering at 
the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and Medicine. The CT2 app was 
created in support of a new Connecticut law passed to track concussions among students 
for grades kindergarten through high school (Connecticut General Assembly, 2015). The 
application will be utilized in Chapter 6 in order to incorporate the trust profile concepts of 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 into a prototype in order to demonstrate how the entire trust profiling 
process works. 




Modern healthcare treatment requires a large amount of data to function efficiently 
and effectively. A patient’s healthcare record includes important data compiled through the 
use of various tests that are highly specialized and expensive, uncomfortable for the patient, 
and sometimes result in long waiting periods before the results of the test are available. 
Such tests may include: blood and tissue laboratory tests, X-Rays, EKGs, mammograms, 
MRI scans, etc. Increased specialization in the healthcare field has created a need for 
patients to travel between multiple healthcare providers, each performing one portion of 
the patient’s treatment. Interoperability between the healthcare systems that the providers 
utilize to compile and store patients’ healthcare records reduces stress to the patient and 
increases efficiency by allowing these teams of specialists to be informed of the patient’s 
current condition, treatments performed by other specialists, and patient history that may 
inform current treatment. However, the current state of trust and interoperability within the 
healthcare field has created barriers to this process including incompatible electronic health 
record (EHR) formats and a lack of universal authentication and authorization methods. 
The creation of the meaningful use guidelines (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2018) has incentivized many EHR software packages such as OpenEMR 
(OpenEMR, 2020), Epic (Epic Systems Corporation, 2020), and WorldVistA 
(WorldVistA, 2020) to create new interoperability software. Although there has been 
improvements, these software solutions often still suffer from issues that limit their overall 
effectiveness. For example Epic’s Care Everywhere (Yale New Haven Health; Yale 
Medical Group, 2020)  creates an electronic exchange among healthcare providers but only 
operates between Epic’s own EHR installations, specifically the different medical practices 




interoperability standards is the lack of a universally adopted standard for health 
information exchange (HIE). Health Level Seven International (HL7 International, 2019) 
(HL7) is an organization created to rectify this by creating and promoting standards for 
EHR interoperability. HL7’s latest standard, Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources 
(FHIR) (HL7 International, 2020) is quickly being adopted by EHRs to facilitate 
interoperability standards for the exchange of healthcare records. OpenEMR currently has 
in-progress work on FHIR integration, but the full implementation is not yet available. 
Although interoperability among healthcare providers is an ongoing goal, there is 
yet to emerge a universal standard for healthcare authentication and authorization. 
Traditionally, authentication and authorization is performed manually by an employee by 
vetting the requestor’s identity and assigning them a set of permissions on the requested 
data. One potential standard, OAuth2 (Hardt, 2012), is being utilized by large companies 
such as Facebook (Facebook, 2020), Google (Google, 2020), and Twitter (Twitter, Inc., 
2020). OAuth2 has the potential to be both a universal authenticator and authorizer by 
offloading the authentication/authorization processes to a third party during a request, then 
sending authentication/authorization data back to the controller. However, OAuth suffers 
from some weaknesses. Although OAuth does have widespread adoption and strong 
industry support, it still requires that the user has been pre-registered before a request can 
be authenticated and only offloads the authentication process to a trusted third party. The 
adoption of a trust negotiation approach eliminates this weakness by allowing for trust to 
be negotiated at request time without needing any prior details and without requiring an 
identity to authenticate to. 




Role-based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & 
Chandramou, 2001) is an access control model that organizes permissions (read, write, 
execute, etc.) into collections referred to as roles. Each user in the access control model is 
assigned one or more roles and each role assigned to the user entitles him/her to the 
associated permissions. When the user requests access to an object protected under RBAC, 
the user chooses a role they have been previously assigned and the permissions associated 
with the role are matched against the requested object. If the role the user has chosen has 
sufficient permissions to access the object, the user obtains access; otherwise the user is 
denied access. RBAC is a popular access control model in the healthcare field due to its 
model matching the methods typically utilized to decide whether a healthcare 
organization’s employee may access healthcare data (Fernández-Alemán, Señor, Lozoya, 
& Toval, 2013) (Alhaqbani & C., 2008). Common roles include: physicians, nurses, billing, 
administration, or receptionists. Data protected by RBAC in a healthcare setting includes: 
demographic data, blood pressure readings, X-Rays, appointment times, ICD10 codes, 
insurance information, etc. During treatment, a physician role may be assigned permissions 
to access the entirety of the patient’s health record including demographics, treatment 
history, and tests, but would be denied access to sensitive records such as the patient’s 
mental healthcare data. Likewise, the billing department’s roles would not have access to 
the patient’s full health record, but would have access to the patient’s insurance info, 
ICD10 codes, and any other data required to properly bill the patient or the insurance 
company. 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976) is constructed 




confidentiality of the data by defining different categories of information. Subjects under 
MAC are assigned a sensitivity level (clearance) based on the level of trust obtained. 
Likewise, objects protected by MAC are also assigned a sensitivity level (classification) 
based on their sensitivity. MAC’s sensitivity model generally is comprised of four 
sensitivity levels: top secret (TS) > secret (S) > classified (C) > unclassified (U). In most 
MAC schemes, a user is permitted to read data that has been classified at or below the 
user’s assigned clearance. A user is permitted to write data which is then classified at or 
above the user’s assigned clearance to prevent sensitive data from leaking downwards. In 
the healthcare industry, a MAC model can be utilized to assign sensitivity levels to data, 
allowing for more granular permissions on healthcare data that may be more sensitive. A 
patient’s demographic information may be classified as U, since the patient’s name, phone 
number, and contact information may be considered low risk, allowing any user with a U 
clearance to request patient demographic information. However, a patient’s drug list may 
be classified as S. Since a drug list may reveal a patient’s conditions, it is considered more 
sensitive information. In this case, a user must have at least an S clearance to view the 
patient’s drug list. The HL7 vocabulary (HL7 International, 2013) defines sensitivity levels 
summarized in Table 2.1 of low, moderate, normal, restricted, unrestricted and very 
restricted, depending on the perceived damage if the healthcare data was leaked. Note that 
we have published an article (Demurjian, Sanzi, Agresta, & Yasnoff, January-June 2019) 







Table 2.1. HL7 Confidentiality Levels. 
 
Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) (Hu, et al., 2014) is an access control 
model where access to an object is dependent upon: a user’s attributes, the object’s 
attributes, and a policy engine that can match the involved attributes, a set of rules, and 
external environmental conditions. The user possesses a set of attributes that describe the 
user, such as: licensing, roles, patient lists, or work schedule. The objects possess their own 
set of attributes such as: patient ID, primary physician, or last editor. The policy engine 
contains a list of programmed access control rules it incorporates into its decision making 
process. During a user request for access, the policy engine reads the user attributes, the 
object’s attributes, other environmental conditions such as the current time, and the access 
control rules. Using the access control rules, the policy engine attempts to match the user’s 
attributes, the object’s attributes, and the environmental conditions in a manner that 
satisfies the access control rules. If this is successful, the user is granted the requested 
U unrestricted
This indicates that the information is not classified as 
sensitive such as  publicly available information, e.g., 
business name, phone, email or physical address.
L low
The information requires protection to maintain low 
sensitivity such as anonymized, pseudonymized, or 
non-PII such as HIPAA limited data
M moderate
This is moderately sensitive information, which 
presents moderate risk of harm if disclosed without 
authorization.
N normal Non-stigmatizing health information, which presents typical risk of harm if disclosed without authorization.
R restricted
Highly sensitive, for normal clinical care, potentially 





 Extremely sensitive and likely stigmatizing health 





access to the object. The policy engine consists of the policy decision point (PDP) and the 
policy enforcement point (PEP). The PDP is responsible for making a decision as to 
whether the access control rules are satisfied while the PEP is responsible for ensuring that 
the decision made by the PDP is enforced. By restricting access based on a set of attributes, 
ABAC allows us to restrict or grant access to objects based on credentials that need not 
include the user’s actual identity. 
ABAC’s core model seen in Figure 2.1, redrawn from (Hu, et al., 2014), contains 
an example related to the healthcare domain. In Figure 2.1, Physician Tom, located to the 
left side of the figure, possesses the attributes: (ROLE: PHYSICIAN and 
PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN for PATIENT_ID: 1). The resource objects, the patient’s 
healthcare records located in the right side of the figure, are annotated with the attributes: 
(PATIENT_ID, PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN, APPOINTMENT_TIME). The listed access 
control rules located in the bottom of the figure indicate that read/write access is granted 
to subjects that are the primary physician of the patient and the patient must have an 
appointment time matching the current time. Read access is granted to any subject who is 
either a nurse or a primary physician. Should Physician Tom request access to the health 
record of Patient 1, the PDP will read the access control rules, Physician Tom’s attributes, 
the attributes for Patient 1’s health record, and the current time. Physician Tom’s attributes 
indicate that he is both a physician and the primary physician for Patient 1. The record 
indicates that it is the record for Patient 1 and that the patient has an appointment at the 
current time. Since these attributes match the first rule, the PDP decides that Physician 
Tom should be granted read/write access to the health record. The PEP ensures that 




nurse. In this case, the second access control rule is invoked, the PDP decides to grant read 























READ/WRITE ACCESS: PRIMARY_PHYSICAN 
&& APPOINTMENT






PRIMARY_PHYSICIAN for PATIENT_ID: 1
 
Figure 2.1. The ABAC Model. 
2.3. Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)  
The Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) specification (FHIR 
DSTU2, 2015) is a standards framework created by the Health Level Seven (HL7) 
organization (HL7, 2011) with the intention of providing easier and quicker 
implementation of interoperability in healthcare systems to facilitate access of mHealth 
apps to healthcare data in the cloud stored in multiple EHR/HIT systems. One of the main 




DSTU2, 2015). There are currently over one hundred forty-five resources (HL7 
International, 2019) that can be represented using JSON, XML, or Turtle that can be 
utilized to map data from a healthcare system. Sample resources include: Patient, 
FamilyMemberHistory, Condition, Observation, Diagnostic Report, Medication, 
Immunization, AllergyIntolerance, AdverseEvent, etc.; and, for InsurancePlan, Coverage, 
EligibilityRequest, Claim, PaymentNotice, etc. The available resources can be accessed 
through the means of a RESTful API, which allows to connect healthcare interfaces with 
data sources that exist in the cloud. Different from SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) 
(W3C, 2007), which has been the dominant approach to manage web services interfaces 
over the past years and is utilized in HL7 v2, RESTful APIs are easier to understand and 
to implement as they rely on HTTP and Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD) 
operations to develop services. In support of the integration of trust profiles and trust 
negotiation with FHIR, we have identified four security levels where security constraints 
are applied: the system level, which guards access to the entire EHR and encompasses all 
available resources; the resource type level, which guards access to all resources of a given 
type (e.g., Observation, Medication Statement, etc.); the resource level, which guards 
access to an individual instance of a resource identified by FHIR ID; and, the consent level, 
which allows the patient whose healthcare data is described by the resource to introduce 
security constraints in support of ONC’s patient consent model (The Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, 2019). 
One popular open-source library that implements the FHIR specification is the 
HAPI FHIR reference implementation (HAPI FHIR, 2014). HAPI FHIR was developed in 




features such as the ability to intercept the server (by using Java servlets (Oracle, 2013)) 
that processes the user’s requests. HAPI FHIR offers the full FHIR REST API in Java and 
support for connecting HAPI FHIR to a back end database that stores the healthcare 
information. An instance of HAPI FHIR can be configured by extending the 
ResourceProvider interface and adding the resulting class to the instance’s resource 
providers. The new ResourceProviders are written containing the functionality to interface 
with the local database by annotating methods utilizing annotations that mark which 
methods are invoked depending on the FHIR REST API calls. A controller may interface 
with a HAPI FHIR server by acting as a front end. A new URL endpoint following the 
FHIR REST standard is created to which a mobile device that supports trust profiles and 
trust negotiation connects. The controller engages in trust negotiation, then retrieves the 
requested FHIR data by forwarding the request to the HAPI FHIR installation if trust 
negotiation is successful. 
  
2.4. The Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) App 
The Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) app is a collaboration between the 
Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science & Engineering at 
the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and Medicine. The CT2 app was 
created as the result of a new law passed in Connecticut (Connecticut General Assembly, 
2015) requiring that concussions be tracked for kids between the ages of 7 to age 19 in 
public schools. The CT2 app is used as proof of concept of the approach described 
throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Figure 2.2 shows a listing of the various 




screens 1 to 4 in the first row and screens 5 to 8 in the second row. Screen 1 is the default 
login screen from which users can register an account or log in to an existing account. 
Screen 2 is the home screen and allows the user to create or retrieve a new entry for a 
student, or to view a list of open concussion cases. Screen 3 is the list screen and displays 
a list of students that the user has permission to read or edit. Screen 4 is the new student 
screen and allows the user to add general information about a new student such as: first 
and last name, the date of birth, the date of the incident, and gender. Screen 5 is the cause 
of injury screen that provides functionality to allow the user to provide details about the 
injury including: the sport being played, the location the injury occurred, the contact 
information, the location of the injury on the student, whether the student was wearing 
protective headgear, and any other additional details. Screen 6 is the symptoms within 48 
hours screen that allows the input of symptoms the student has felt within 48 hours of the 
concussion incident. Inputs include: loss of consciousness and length of loss of 
consciousness, whether the parents were notified within 24 hours of the incident, whether 
the student was removed from the activity and who removed them from the activity, the 
concussion assessment tool used, and any other additional comments. Screen 7 is the injury 
follow-up screen and allows input of symptoms past the 48 hour period. Inputs include the 
timeframe in which symptoms were resolved, who diagnosed the concussion, whether there 
was any other post concussive symdrome diagnoses, the medical imaging used on the 
student, and other additional comments. The last screen, screen 8, provides for the input of 
when the student is allowed to return to the school. Inputs include days absent from school, 
schedule modification, whether a 504 plan is required, the date the student returned to the 
















In this chapter, we describe the infrastructure requirements for trust negotiation and 
provide a detailed explanation of the different components involved in trust negotiation 
and the interactions among them with examples provided within the healthcare domain. 
This chapter consists of 4 sections. Section 3.1 describes Identity and Attribute certificates 
that form a verifiable container for the credentials that are necessary for communicating 
the components of a trust profile within a domain. Section 3.2 explains the process of trust 
negotiation and the communication process that occurs between two participants during 
the establishment of mutual trust through the utilization of a controller. Recall that to 
support the trust negotiation process, each participating HIT system (for the user or the 
data source), has a controller that facilitates the request from the user and utilizes the trust 
profile to determine if a user without a pre-existing relationship can access the requested 
data. Section 3.3 explorers the Trust Profile Certificate Infrastructure that adopts a chain-
of-trust model that allows for the creation of new entries for a trust profile by establishing 
mutual trust between the trust profile entries of unknown healthcare providers and a method 
of verifying trust profile entries. Lastly, Section 3.4 reviews the structure of a controller’s 
infrastructure that includes parts and operation in detail. All of the concepts discussed in 
Sections 3.1 to 3.4 support expected Contribution A: Infrastructure Requirements to 
Promote Trust Among Organizations Participating in Trust Negotiation. Section 3.3 also 




Access to Sensitive Data while Section 3.4 supports the implementation of expected 
Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies. Finally note 
that the concepts throughout this chapter can be interpreted in a general manner to apply to 
any domain, but in order to make the discussion more relevant in support of the rest of the 
dissertation, we focus on the interactions of healthcare organizations. Concepts of Identity 
and Attribute certificates in Section 3.1, the trust negotiation and communication in Section 
3.2, the trust profile certificate infrastructure in Section 3.3, and the controller 
infrastructure in Section 3.4 all are generalizable and applicable to other domains. 
3.1. Identity and Attribute Certificates 
A certificate is a file that provides a verifiable digital signature on the data 
contained within it. Certificates are widely used to verify that: the user has connected to 
the correct server, the connection is secure against man in the middle (MITM) attacks, and 
provides a secure manner to negotiate a symmetric key for efficient connection encryption. 
The most widely implemented standard for certificates, X.509 (Cooper, et al., 2008), 
provides both identity certificates and attribute certificates (Farrell & Housley, 2002). 
Although the X.509 identity certificate standard provides provisions for creating additional 
attributes, the attribute certificate is useful for shorter lived attributes and for decoupling 
the user’s identification attributes from additional descriptive attributes. Pairing identity 
and attribute certificates together provides a platform for decentralized authorization 
management. The remainder of this section describes identity certificates and the chain of 
trust along with a detailed discussion of attribute certificates 
An identity certificate is a file that provides ownership information by providing a 




a public key that only the legitimate certificate holder can prove ownership of. By proving 
ownership of the public key, the owner also proves ownership of the certificate itself. When 
a certificate is created, the owner generates a public/private key pair. The private key is 
kept secret, while the public key is entered into a certificate signing request (CSR). When 
the certificate has been signed, the certificate acts as a notification as to the owner’s public 
key and may be safely disseminated to any interested parties. When the owner of a 
certificate needs to be confirmed, it is sufficient to determine that the potential owner 
possesses the private key paired with the public key in the certificate, assuming that the 
private key has been kept secret by the owner. When another party needs to determine that 
they are communicating with the certificate’s owner, a challenge is encrypted by the public 
key and sent to the potential owner. If the potential owner is in possession of the private 
key, the private key is used to decrypt the challenge. The owner signs the response with 
the private key and sends it back to the challenger. If the challenger verifies the response 
with the public key and the response is correct, the challenger knows they are 
communicating with the certificate’s owner. 
An identity certificate consists of multiple parts including: a version number, serial 
number, issuer name, validity period, subject name, subject public key, and a certificate 
signature. The serial number is an identifier of the certificate and must be unique for each 
certificate signed by an issuer. Therefore, each certificate may be uniquely identified by 
serial number and issuer. The issuer name describes the signer of the certificate. The 
validity period specifies the time period during which the certificate may be considered 
valid, consisting of not before and not after dates. The subject name specifies the owner of 




the certificate was created. The subject public key is the public key of the owner generated 
as part of a public/private key pair and used for identifying the owner. The certificate 
signature is a digital signature of the certificate created by the certificate issuer at the time 
the certificate is created. The signature consists of a hash of the other information in the 
certificate signed with the certificate signer’s private key. The certificate signer, known as 
a certificate authority (CA), is the entity from the issuer field and is responsible for 
verifying the information in the CSR and creating the digital signature. 
The digital signature provided by the CA on the identity certificate is required to 
bind the subject to the given public key to enable trust in the signed certificate. Without 
the signature to provide verification of the signature data, an attacker could simply provide 
a different subject public key paired with their own private key to hijack the connection. In 
order to ensure that the digital signature is valid, anyone using the certificate must also 
verify the certificate of the signing CA. The X.509 standard supports a chain of trust, or a 
linking of digital signatures from the “leaf certificate”, or the first certificate in the chain, 
through intermediate CAs, to the root authority. The root authority is the last signature in 
the chain. The root authority’s certificate is not signed by a higher CA, but is signed using 
the private key of the root authority itself, providing a self-signed certificate. The only 
method available for a root authority’s certificate to be verified is if it is already present in 
the user’s local certificate store, which is a local collection of certificates whose signatures 
are trusted automatically by the user. During verification, a user must obtain each 
certificate in the chain, and inspect the signatures starting from the leaf certificate to the 
root certificate until: one of the certificates matches a certificate in the certificate store or 




are verified and the leaf certificate is considered valid and trustworthy; in the latter case, 
the certificate cannot be verified and is considered untrustworthy. An example of the chain 
of trust is given in Figure 3.1. In the example, the trust flows from the Root CA Certificate 
















Figure 3.1. The Chain of Trust. 
 
An attribute certificate (Farrell & Housley, 2002) is a digitally signed certificate 
that can act as an extension to an identity certificate, providing more detailed information 
about the owner of the identity certificate. Each attribute certificate can be paired with one 
identity certificate.  Although attribute certificates are digitally signed, they lack the subject 
public key field that allows the certificate owner to authenticate themselves to the 
certificate and the data it holds. Attribute certificates are paired with an identity certificate 
through the identity certificate’s serial number and issuer field. Although an attribute 
certificate can only be paired with a maximum of one identity certificate, multiple attribute 
certificates may be attached to the same identity certificate. Attribute certificates have 
fields similar to the identity certificate including: the version number, holder, issuer, 
signature, a serial number, and validity period. The body of an attribute certificate contains 
a list of attributes in key-value pair format. Like the digital signature of the identity 




certificate signed with the issuer’s private key. An attribute certificate’s authority is 
referred to as attribute authority (AA) and may be chained in the same manner as a 
certificate authority (CA). By utilizing attribute certificates in conjunction with identity 
certificates, the authentication and authorization data can be separated, with the identity 
certificate providing authentication for the certificate owner and the attribute certificate 
providing the data necessary for authorization. This allows the identity and authorization 
data to be long-lived while providing for the ability to expand upon or change authorization 
without the necessity of modifying the identity certificate. 
3.2. Trust Negotiation Process 
Trust negotiation (Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) is the process of 
establishing mutual trust between two entities through the gradual exchange of credentials. 
In this context, trust is the ability for two entities to: believe in the authenticity of one 
another’s credentials, utilize those credentials to determine the trustworthiness of each 
other with regards to handling sensitive data, and predict that each participant will handle 
any transferred sensitive data appropriately and securely. Each trust negotiation procedure 
begins with the requestor’s request for sensitive data. The requestor contacts the controller 
over a secure connection and sends the controller the first set of credentials it has chosen 
to reveal. The controller receives the request for trust negotiation and retrieves a credential 
expression, represented byψ, which takes the form of a logical expression that denotes the 
credentials that the requestor must possess to obtain access to the requested object. If the 
initial set of credentials is sufficient to satisfy the credential expression, the controller 




to the requestor indicating the remaining required credentials. The requestor may also 
request credentials from the controller if required. This allows the use of credentials that 
are sensitive by allowing the credentials themselves to be annotated with a desired trust 
level. Each round of trust negotiation results in a higher level of trust between the requestor 
and controller until the controller’s credential expression is satisfied, or the requestor and 
controller no longer have any remaining credentials that may be sent. If the expression is 
satisfied, the request for trust negotiation is successful and the requestor obtains access to 
the requested object; otherwise, the request for trust negotiation has failed and the requestor 
does not obtain access. Adaptive trust negotiation (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, & 
Seamons, 2005) refers to trust negotiation where the controller is able to adapt its credential 
expressions depending on the requestor’s credentials and the requested object. 
The usefulness and flexibility of the trust negotiation process has resulted in 
adaptations to mobile devices and healthcare (Vawdrey, Sundelin, Seamons, & Knutson, 
2003). The credentials involved in trust negotiation are often encoded in certificates. 
Surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003) allows the use of a surrogate for mobile 
device trust negotiation to assist in the management and disclosure of credentials. A trusted 
server may act as a proxy to the mobile device, performing trust negotiation calculations 
on its behalf. Credential disclosure may be controlled by trust agents, which are 
autonomous programs that disclose secure credentials based on pre-defined credential 
access policies. A remote trust agent running on a surrogate must be completely trusted by 





As a healthcare focused example of adaptive trust negotiation, consider Physician 
Tom attempting to access his patient’s health record at a remote hospital as shown in Figure 
3.2. Physician Tom possesses credentials indicating his medical licensing, his current 
workplace, and that he is the patient’s practicing physician (Certificates License, 
Employer, Inpatient in the upper left side of Figure 3.2 under Tom). Physician Tom uses 
his mobile device to connect to his local hospital’s Local Trust Agent server in order to 
initiate a Trust Negotiation Request (line 1 in Figure 3.2) to the Remote Hospital’s EHR. 
The EHR receives the Request for  Patient  Record (line 2 in Figure 3.2), creates a 
Credential Expression (line 3 in Figure 3.2), and sends the Credential Expression to 
Physician Tom (line 4 in Figure 3.2). The Credential Expression sent indicates that 
indicates that access to the record will be provided if: the requestor is licensed, employed 
at a known healthcare organization, and is currently treating the patient. The Local Trust 
Agent sends a credential with Tom’s medical license and a request for a credential 
indicating that the EHR’s security has been certified by an outside healthcare security 
consultant (line 5 in Figure 3.2). The EHR verifies the Medical License and sends a 
credential indicating the Security Certification back to the trust agent (line 6 in Figure 3.2). 
The Local Trust Agent, satisfied that the EHR is secure, sends the remaining current 
employment (Employer) and Inpatient treatment credentials (line 7 in Figure 3.2). The 
EHR receives them and verifies them. Now that the Credential Expression has been 
satisfied (line 8 in Figure 3.2), the EHR reports a successful trust negotiation attempt and 
sends the patient’s Health Record to Physician Tom, who is now able to view the patient’s 






Figure 3.2. Trust Negotiation Request. 
3.3. Trust Profile Certificate Infrastructure 
The trust profile is capable of establishing trust between the requestor (e.g., 
physician, nurse, health insurance representative, etc.) and an  organization’s EHR by 
providing a standard set of credentials describing sensitive data access allowed by a peer  
organization (e.g., another hospital). Before the controller can make a decision as to 
whether the trust profile contains sufficient credentials to access the requested sensitive 
material, the credentials themselves must be valid to ensure that the credentials describe 
real accesses to other organizations. The trust profile’s data can be trusted as valid if: the 
trust profile owner’s ownership is confirmed through the identity certificate’s public key, 
the digital signatures listed in the identity and attribute certificates are valid, and the 
controller confirms that the signers of the identity attribute certificates are authorized to 




controller only trusts the judgement of real organizations and prevents an attacker from 
creating and signing their own trust profile certificates. 
In order to establish trust among the healthcare organizations participating in trust 
negotiation, they must each trust mutual medical authorities. A medical authority performs 
a function similar to the certificate authorities that sign certificates for secure 
communication for website login data. The medical authority is responsible for signing 
X.509 CA certificates for each healthcare organization’s CA and AA. Medical authorities 
provide their root certificates for healthcare organizations to validate the digital signatures 
on the trust profile entries digitally signed by their peers, whose CA and AA certificates 
were signed by the medical authority. Unlike a certificate authority, whose role may be 
limited to verifying that the certificate owner of the certificate the CA signed owns the 
domain listed in the certificate, the medical authority is also responsible for ensuring that 
the healthcare organizations’ private keys that match the public keys listed in their CA 
certificates are stored in a safe and secure manner. Theft of the private key threatens the 
validity of the portions of trust profiles signed with the stolen private key since those entries 
could be forged. A signature from a valid medical authority on a healthcare organization’s 
CA and AA certificates builds trust by ensuring that proper security measures are being 
properly followed. 
The establishment of trust from the medical authority, to the local healthcare 
organization, to the trust profile owner follows the X.509 chain of trust model as previously 
shown in Figure 3.1. In the chain of trust model, validation of a certificate starts with the 
last certificate in the chain, the leaf certificate depicted in the left side of Figure 3.1, and 




certificates matches a certificate in the local certificate store or the last, self-signed root 
authority certificate is found. The medical authority, whose certificate is represented by the 
Root CA Certificate in the right side of Figure 3.1, establishes trust between the various 
healthcare organizations participating in trust negotiation by signing the CA and AA 
certificates of the healthcare organization in the middle of Figure 3.1 and making its own 
self-signed root certificate available. Any healthcare organization that places a copy of the 
medical authority’s root certificate in their local certificate store indicates that any 
certificates signed by the medical authority are trustworthy. Using this process, those 
healthcare organizations also indicate that peer healthcare organizations’ CAs and AAs 
that are signed by the medical authority are also trustworthy. This chain of trust flows 
downward into the certificates that comprise a healthcare professional’s trust profile. Thus, 
trust flows from the medical authority to the CAs and AAs of healthcare organizations 
sharing sensitive data to the healthcare professionals employed by those healthcare 
organizations attempting to obtain sensitive data. Multiple medical authorities may be 
present on the network and healthcare organizations are free to choose which medical 
authorities will be trusted, as well as choosing individual healthcare organizations to trust 
directly through the local certificate store.  
In the event of a security breach resulting in a problem with the private keys of a 
set of trust profile certificates, the CAs or AAs may issue an entry in their certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs) as specified by the X.509 standard (Cooper, et al., 2008). Likewise, 
the certificates of a compromised or misbehaving CA or AA may also be revoked by the 
medical authority if the CA or AA fails to meet proper security requirements or issues 




signed list of the serial numbers of certificates that should not be considered valid, and 
information regarding their current state of trustworthiness. During certificate validation, 
the certificate validator must consult an up-to-date CRL, with all trust profile entries whose 
certificates appear on the CRL not being considered acceptable for use in trust negotiation. 
Whether trust negotiation immediately fails depends on the listed reason for certificate 
invalidation. For instance, the CRL may list that hackers have stolen the owner’s primary 
key, and thus proper ownership of the certificates cannot be ascertained. The CRL also 
provides the function of allowing employers to terminate trust profile entries indicating 
current employment should the employee change jobs. 
Figure 3.3 depicts an example trust network with multiple medical authorities 
establishing trust among Family Medical Center (FMC), Saint Francis Hospital (SFH), and 
Hartford Hospital (HH). In Figure 3.3, the dashed arrows represent that the healthcare 
organizations’ CA and AA certificates have been signed by that medical authority, and that 
the medical authority has performed security audits on the healthcare organizations’ trust 
negotiation setup. The dashed arrows also represent that the local trust certificate store 
contains a copy of the medical authority’s self-signed certificate, since the medical 
authority that signed the healthcare organization’s CA and AA is trusted by default. The 
solid arrows represent trust placed in the medical authority by the local healthcare 
organization by placing the medical authority’s self-signed certificate into the local trust 
certificate store. Each of these healthcare organizations is therefore able to trust the others’ 
entries in trust profile certificates, since during certificate validation each certificate chain 
will result in eventually validating a medical authority certificate that appears in the local 




a different medical authority. This system allows for multiple competing medical 
authorities and prevents creating a single point of failure on the network, while still 
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Figure 3.3. Example Network With Multiple Medical Authorities. 
3.4. Controller Structure 
The trust profile combined with an adaptive trust negotiation approach is dependent 
on the interactions occurring between the users’ trust profile and the controllers. This 
adaptive approach and the organic growth of the trust profile requires a more complex 
controller. We have organized the Trust Negotiation Server into five distinct components 
as depicted in the boxed area of the right side of Figure 3.4. The five components are: the 




Policy Generation component, the Credential Generation component, and the Data 
Collection and Delivery component. The  responsibilities of the five components include: 
verifying the trust profile’s structure and content; determining proper ownership of the trust 
profile without needing to verify a specific identity; matching the user’s chosen subset of 
the trust profile against a security administrator-defined security policy on the requested 
data; delivering the requested sensitive data from the EHR to the requestor, including any 
necessary modifications required by the adaptive approach specified in the security policy; 
and, communicating with the user and the local CA and AA to create a new entry for the 
user’s trust profile. Finally note that the blue ovals in the Trust Negotiations server box of 


































When authorization through trust negotiation is requested by the user, the controller 
begins by receiving the request and validating the initial certificates passed by the user. 
The Trust Profile Validation component verifies the certificates so other components of the 
Controller are able to trust the credentials and determine if they are sufficient for data 
access. The Security Policy Generation component reads the security metadata attached to 
the requested Medical Data using the FHIR standard and uses this data as well as 
administrator provided Security Policy Generation rules to generate a credential expression 
that the Security Policy Matching component will match the user’s Trust Profile against to 
determine whether access is granted. The Security Policy Generation component is also 
responsible for generating ancillary release actions, such as triggering logging records or 
redacting data that the user has not obtained enough trust to receive. The Security Policy 
Matching component is responsible for receiving the generated security policy as a 
credential expression and matching it to Trust Profile entries extracted from the previously 
validated trust profile certificates. This component also notifies the user if the credentials 
previously sent are insufficient and the nature of the credentials that must be presented in 
order to build further trust. Further presented Trust Profile credentials are passed to the 
Trust Profile Validation component to be verified before the Security Policy Matching 
component receives them for as many trust negotiation rounds as necessary. When the 
Security Policy Matching component decides the user has been successful in obtaining 
trust, it notifies the Credential Generation and Data Collection and Delivery components. 
The Credential Generation component communicates with the user to add trust profile 
entries detailing the successful access to data, while the Data Collection and Delivery 




(e.g., converting to a FHIR interoperability format, redacting data that should not be sent 
to the user, etc.), and performs any ancillary actions required by the security policy (e.g., 





Trust Profile Model and Adaptive Trust 
Negotiation Approach 
 
In this chapter, we describe our extensions to the adaptive trust negotiation 
framework introduced and discussed in Section 3.2 in order to provide a formal trust profile 
model that is able to represent all of the necessary concepts for tracking a user, a users trust 
profile, the controller, and all of the underlying concepts that are necessary to facilitate the 
trust negotiation process. In support of this, this chapter consists of 4 sections. Section 4.1 
describes the trust profile’s structure and usage in detail, focusing on all of the required 
constructs and the way that they interact with one another, that are required to support the 
formal model to be presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.2 presents and explains the formal 
model for supporting trust profiles in the trust profile negotiation process which allows 
each organization (e.g., a hospital or a medical practice) that supports trust negotiation to 
independently protect their health data while being able to endorse users as trustworthy 
from other organizations (other hospitals or medical practices or any HIT system) as well. 
Section 4.3 provides an example of the concepts presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in the 
healthcare domain to clearly demonstrate the applicability of our work in practice in a 
realistic setting, fully illustrating the concept and content of a trust profile along with the 
trust negotiation that occurs with the controller to allow for a decision to be made about 
access to the requested sensitive data. Please note that our approach can work with any 
organization that requires control of highly sensitive information. Section 4.4 presents 




and compares and contrasts the releated works to our research. All of the concepts 
discussed in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 support expected Contribution B: Trust Profile for 
Recording Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data while Section 4.3 also 
supports the implementation of expected Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive 
Access Control Policies. 
4.1. The Trust Profile Concept 
The trust profile is an extension to the concept of trust negotiation (Winsborough, 
Seamons, & Jones, 2000) that provides an automated form of trust gain over the course of 
a user interacting with a secure system over a period of time. This is accomplished by the 
accumulation of credentials over time as the user securely accesses the authenticated HIT 
systems to which they have been authorized. The result is a historical record that is 
summarized as the trust that the owner has obtained over the course of a long career 
handling sensitive information. As the user demonstrates the capacity to obtain, utilize, and 
protect this secure information, there is often an expansion in the user’s responsibilities 
within an organization and an increased ability to access more heavily secured information. 
This trust is accumulated as the trust profile is updated over the lifetime that the user is 
working for any organization which requires access to sensitive data. The trust profile’s 
strength is its ability to automatically model this increase in trust placed in the user without 
the need for constant human intervention. The trust profile records all of the owner’s access 
to sensitive information, whether it is accessed locally or remotely; or accessed from the 
user’s current employment with an organization (e.g., for our purposes a healthcare 
organization such as a hospital or a medical practice), past employment with an 




or from another organization with no pre-existing relationship with the user. In the event 
that the user requires access to sensitive data in a time critical situation from another 
organization that the user has not been pre-authorized to access, the user can enter trust 
negotiation with the data’s controller, utilizing a subset of individual records of sensitive 
data access within the trust profile as a set of credentials, supplemented by traditional static 
credentials common in trust negotiation such as medical licensing. Note that from this point 
on we omit the use of healthcare references as we discuss the concept of trust profiles in 
the formal model in more general terms. 
In addition to the trust profile’s ability to model the user’s increase in 
trustworthiness by accumulating credentials throughout the user’s career, we also introduce 
adaptiveness to the process by providing additional actions to the controller that may be 
undertaken depending on how the controller interprets the credentials offered in the trust 
profile and the details of the user’s initial request for data resource access. Local 
administrators of the controller may define methods for the controller to fine-tune the level 
of trust present in a trust negotiation attempt by creating sets of release actions that the 
controller may undertake to increase security assurance while also providing methods to 
make sensitive data more available, particularly in time critical or emergency situations. 
For instance, an administrator may define that a requestor requesting access to a patient’s 
drug list must present at least three credentials from the trust profile indicating that the 
requestor has successfully accessed patient drug data in the past and at least one credential 
from the trust profile indicating access to the health record of the requested patient from 
the controller in the past. The administrator creates a set of release actions indicating that 




at another organization. In the case that the access occurred at another organization, access 
would still be allowed from the requested organization, whose controller would note the 
access in the audit log as a higher risk transaction and a notification would be dispatched 
to the organization’s local auditor. This allows the requestor multiple secure paths to access 
sensitive, time-critical data without compromising health record security and for swift 
responses on the part of the local organization should sensitive health data be obtained 
inappropriately. 
Every stakeholder (e.g., physicians, nurses, specialists, pharmacists, insurance 
agents, healthcare researchers, therapists, etc.) must be provided with a trust profile to 
access secure data when they first have a need to access sensitive data. Note this might also 
occur as part of the overall authorization and authentication process when new employees 
are created and given permissions on the local database. The stakeholder’s employer is 
responsible for initializing the trust profile, which marks the stakeholder as having been 
manually vetted by the organization during pre-employment and having been found to be 
trustworthy in handling highly sensitive data. If the stakeholder later leaves the employer 
and finds employment elsewhere, the stakeholder retains the trust profile and the data 
contained within, as the trust profile is a permanent record of the stakeholder’s sensitive 
data access over an entire career. These are essentially credentials that an individual takes 
with them as they move between different locations to administer care to patients. The 
stakeholder no longer has entries in the trust profile indicating that the owner is currently 
an associate of the previous employer, but retains data indicating previous employment 
during the period when the entries were made. The stakeholder is then free to obtain 

























Figure 4.1. Example Trust Profile Negotiation. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the connection between the trust profile owner, the owner’s 
employers, and the controllers. In Figure 4.1, Jane, a medical provider, possesses a mobile 
device from Family Medical Center (FMC) loaded with their mHealth app. The mHealth 
app is capable of accessing FMC’s EHR with traditional credentials, but also supports 
requesting access from other EHRs, such as St. Francis Hospital (SFH) and Hartford 
Hospital (HH) through trust profile-based trust negotiation. The Trust arrows to/from FMC 
and SFH to the Trust Profile (TP) indicate that Jane has entries in her Trust Profile from 




from FMC and SFH and that those accesses have been recorded in the Trust Profile. Should 
Jane require access to her patient’s health data located at HH, the mHealth app will send a 
subset of the Trust Profile, compiled into a digital wallet, to HH’s Trust Negotiation Server. 
The entries chosen from the Trust Profile indicate the level of trust from both FMC, Jane’s 
current employer, and SFH, a different healthcare organization Jane established trust with 
previously utilizing trust negotiation. HH’s Trust Negotiation Server finds indications in 
the Trust Profile from FMC indicating that Jane is a current employee and has been 
manually vetted, while the entries from SFH indicate additional trust. HH’s Trust 
Negotiation Server decides whether the credentials are sufficient, and if negotiation 
successful returns the requested data and a new entry for the Trust Profile describing the 
access. 
The trust profile is implemented as a collection of identity and attribute certificates. 
Attribute certificates encode the trust profile data in a key-value pair relationship. The 
identity certificate serves as a method of authenticating ownership of the attribute 
certificates presented during trust negotiation to the user. The dual use of identity and 
attribute certificates is required because the X.509 standard does not provide a method of 
verifying ownership of an attribute certificate using public key infrastructure. Instead, each 
attribute certificate is associated with an X.509 identity certificate that does provide 
ownership verification through the listed public key. During trust negotiation, all attribute 
certificates sent must also be paired with their identity certificate or ownership cannot be 
verified. Once ownership of the identity certificate has been verified by verifying that the 
requestor possesses the private key associated with the listed public key in the identity 




a previously verified identity certificate. The encoded identity information stored within 
the identity certificates is not required to specifically identify the trust profile owner, but 
to ensure that the requestor is the owner of the attribute certificates chosen to form a subset 
of the trust profile for trust negotiation. The user obtains one identity certificate from the 
controller of each system accessed during the first successful attempt to request sensitive 
data. The identity certificate does not contain any access history specific data. 
The attribute certificates contain individual entries that describe an access. Each 
sensitive data access results in at least one new attribute certificate, which is associated 
with the identity certificate obtained from the controller. Thus, a trust profile is comprised 
of one or more identity certificates, each representing at least one access from a controller; 
and each identity certificate will have one or more attribute certificates attached to it, each 
attribute certificate representing one aspect of access to one specific requested resource. 
These attribute certificates may represent: access to a requested object, the sensitivity level 
of the requested object, or a sensitivity level representing the highest sensitivity object the 
trust profile owner has obtained from the controller of that system. A fourth attribute 
certificate is provided that represents a current employer of the owner and denotes that the 
owner has been manually vetted by the employer during the course of employment. This 
fourth attribute certificate must be assigned manually by the employer. This combination 
of identity and attribute certificates provides the flexibility of being able to encode multiple 
accesses to sensitive data to the same healthcare organization using attribute certificates, 
while also minimizing the number of ownership verifications of identity certificates. 
Minimizing the number of public key ownership verifications is important because the 




which may overtax less powerful CPUs on mobile devices or trust negotiation servers 
handling multiple concurrent requests. 
An example trust profile subset is displayed in Figure 4.2. The physician illustrated 
has obtained secure access to Family Health Center, UCHC, and SFH in the past and 
possesses an identity certificate from each, representing the trust he has obtained from each 
organization. On the first access to each of these organizations, the controller has informed 
him of successful access and requested a new public key for the identity certificate. The 
attribute certificates associated with the identity certificate, whose associations are 
represented with arrows connecting the certificates, represent aspects of each successful 
access to the controller that created the associated identity certificate. During a new request 
for sensitive data, the physician may choose any combination of attribute certificates and 
their associated identity certificates and present the accesses the certificates represent as 
proof of trust obtained from those systems. Further accesses to systems that issue the 
identity certificates result in new attribute certificates detailing the access with new 
associations to that identity certificate, while access to the previously unknown Hartford 
Hospital as pictured will require the generation of a new X.509 identity certificate and new 












Figure 4.2. Example Trust Profile Structure. 
4.2. A Trust Profiling Model for Trust Negotiation 
In this section, we propose and explain a model for trust negotiation that presents a 
new trust profile that utilizes role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, 
Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001), mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La 
Padula, 1976), and attribute-based access control (ABAC) (Hu, et al., 2014) to model the 
sensitivity of information being requested, governed by role with credentials captured in 
attributes via ABAC. Recall that trust is the ability for two entities to believe one another 
and trust negotiation (Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000) is a process of two entities 
with no pre-existing knowledge of one another building trust by exchanging digital 
credentials. Our work specifically extends the trust negotiation approach by creating a 
living trust profile containing a complete record of the user’s access history. The remainder 




by the confidentiality of requested information to be accessed, role-based capabilities, and 
attributed-based access control to capture credentials. Note that this model is independent 
of the healthcare domain, it is a realization of the trust profile concepts as given in Figures 
1.1 and 1.2. Continuing on with the discussion in the early portions of this dissertation, we 
leverage the healthcare domain and associated examples to explain the model concepts. 
To begin the discussion of the formal model for trust profiles, we define a number 
of key terms. 
Defn. 1: A User, U = <uid, uname>, is a trust profile owner identified by id and name. 
Defn. 2: A Requestor, R = <rid, rname>, is a user engaged in trust negotiation by id and 
name.   
Defn. 3: A Controller, C = <cid, cname>, accepts requests for trust negotiation by id and 
name. 
Defn. 4: A Security Agent, SA = <said, saname>,  is an autonomous entity that manages 
receiving and disclosing credentials on behalf of a Requestor or Controller 
denoted respectively as SARequestor or SAController identified by id and name. 
Defn. 5: A Credential Expression, ψ, is a logical expression that represents the credentials 
necessary to establish trust between a Requestor (SARequestor) and Controller 
(SAController). 
Defn. 6: A data resource is defined in two different steps; 
a. A Data Resource Descriptor, DRDescriptor = <DRType, DRCRUD>, provides a 




resource , an object in JSON or XML format) and DRCRUD a set of CRUD 
operations (CREATE | READ | UPDATE | DELETE) R wishes to perform 
on the requested object. 
b. A Data Resource, DR = <DRDescriptor, DRID>, is identified by a DRID unique 
identifier and DRDescriptor the type of resource requested. The DR represents 
a portion of information of interest. 
Defn. 7: A System, S = <SName, SID,  DRSset > is identified by SID  unique identifier, SName  the 
name of the system (e.g., an HIT system such as an EHR), and DRSset the set of 
all data resources (e.g., the set of all FHIR resources in an EHR)  for the system 
as given in Defn. 6.  
Defn. 8: A Role, r, is a designation that represents the types of tasks the role’s owner is 
expected to perform (e.g., physician, psychiatrist, nurse, etc.). 
Briefly, we review  the definitions. Controllers guard data and determine access to 
a data resource DR whereas requestors initiate the request for a resource. A credential 
expression, denoted ψ, represents the credentials that must be presented by the requestor to 
the controller to release a resource. If a set of credentials c satisfies ψ, it is denoted as 
𝑠𝑎𝑡(c, 𝜓) (see Defn. 5). In healthcare, a participant would be a physician attempting to 
access an EHR or a hospital that possesses a patient’s EHR. A controller would be a 
repository of public health data or a hospital that possesses a patient’s EHR, and credential 
expressions would be utilized to determine the records of access to health records that must 
be present in the physician’s presented trust profile to obtain access to a new health record. 




security agents SA (see Defn. 4). The requestor and controller each possess their own SA 
that is responsible for releasing the owner’s credentials and receiving the other participant’s 
credentials. The process of exchanging credentials, depending on the level of trust 
established, continues until either the requestor has established enough trust with the 
controller to complete the request, or it is determined that trust cannot be established. If the 
exchanged credentials are insufficient to establish trust, a Server Governance Policy (SGP) 
is exchanged to alert the other participant to the credentials required to complete the 
negotiation. Defn. 6a and 6b provide methods for identifying specific records that R is 
performing the negotiation to obtain. The DRDescriptor is comprised of a DRType, which denotes 
the type of FHIR resource requested, such as a patient medication, and a DRCRUD which 
indicates the CRUD operations the requester R wants to perform on the requested resource. 
The user U corresponds with the Physician pictured in Figure 4.2 When the 
Physician sends a request for trust negotiation, the Physician becomes the Requestor R. 
The uid is the unique combination of the issuer and serial number present on the identity 
certificates in the trust profile while uname is specified in the domain field as a 
name@domain pairing. These identity certificates are represented in Figure 4.2 in the 
X.509 identity certificates provided by Family Health Center, UCHC, and St. Francis 
Hospital. The controller as presented in the formal definition refers to the HIT Controller 
structure presented in Figure 3.4 introduced in Section 3.4. The <cid, cname> pairing 
represents the unique serial number/issuer combination listed on the HIT Controller’s 
Medical Authority certificate and the name is the controller’s domain name. The controller 
is responsible for protecting the data of the system in Defn. 7, which is represented by the 




categorized by type and annotated with HAPI FHIR Security Data utilized by the HIT 
Controller to generate the credential expression ψ. The role specified in Defn. 8 refers not 
only to the role the user U has chosen to perform trust negotiation under, but also references 
the trust profile entries that record the user’s role at the time of a sensitive data access 
during a successful trust negotiation. These records are illustrated in the Trust Profile 
presented in Figure 4.3. 
Given the initial set of definitions, the next set of definitions formalizes the 
components and structure of the trust profile including: access history properties, digital 
signatures, access history records, identity certificates, attribute certificates, the trust 
profile itself, and the digital wallet. 
Defn. 9: An Access History Property, AHP = <ptype, pvalue>, is a single property that 
describes one attribute describing past access to a resource. 
Defn. 10: An Issuer, I = <idIssuer, PubKeyIssuer>, is a controller that creates entries for 
a requestor’s trust profile.  
Defn. 11: A Digital Signature, DS = sign(PrivKeyIssuer, hash(IC)), is a 
cryptographically-signed assurance that the signed content is both valid and 
unaltered since the information has been signed. A DS establishes the authenticity 
of a portion of the trust profile. The signature is created by encrypting a hash of 
the content the user’s IC or AC with the issuer’s private key. 
Defn. 12: An Access History Record, AHR = < AHR 1, AHR 2, …, AHR n>, is a set of 
properties describing access to one resource. The number and types of properties 




Defn. 13: An Identity Certificate, IC = <idUser, PubKeyUser, idIssuer, dsIssuer>, binds all 
attribute certificates issued for  a single user from a single organization to a public 
key, allowing controllers to determine ownership of the attribute certificates by 
asking the requestor to prove knowledge of the associated private key (a 
cryptographic challenge). 
Defn. 14: An Attribute Certificate, AC = <ic, dsissuer, type, t, opt> contains information 
to be tracked on a requestor’s actions over time and is a five tuple that has: an 
identity certificate, ic, per Defn. 13; a digital signature, ds, per Defn. 11; the type 
of the AC; a timestamp indicating the time of access; and, a set of optional, opt, 
values depending on type. The four types of ACs with opt information are: 
a. ACDataResourceAccess: A record of a single access to a specific resource in a particular 
system by role (AHR) where opt=<uid, rid, drid, sysid>  are the user, assigned 
role, data resource, and system.   
b. ACAffiliation: An affiliation of an organization on a network where opt=<uid, affilid> 
are user and affiliation ids for  a given user.   
c. ACDataResourceConfidentiality: A confidentiality level for a specific resource where opt=<uid, 
cl, drid, sysid> for a given user is the clearance level of the data resource and 
its system.   
d. ACSystemConfidentiality: A confidentiality level that is the highest level of sensitivity for 
each system that has been accessed by the user at any time where opt=<uid, cl, 




Note that in our model, ICs and AC s are created upon successful trust negotiation 
by a controller for future use of the requestor (the user). Consequently, the exact properties 
used to describe the access are dependent on the controller and the domain. For instance, 
when accessing electronic healthcare records (EHRs) in the healthcare domain, the 
properties may include: the role under which access is allowed, the exact record that was 
accessed, the type of record accessed (e.g., MRI scan, general health record, drug list, etc.), 
the patient whose record was accessed, whether the requestor was an employee or the 
access was remote at the time of access, and a timestamp denoting the exact time of access. 
Affiliation is an endorsement of a subset of the user’s trust profile by a controller 
that has vetted the user more thoroughly and endorses the user’s continued use of trust 
negotiation to obtain access to related resources. For instance, in the healthcare field, a 
physician participating in trust negotiation would have current affiliations with his/her 
current employer(s), who would be a healthcare organization trusted by other controllers 
within the healthcare network. A controller that grants a user an affiliation serves the dual 
purpose of providing initial entries into the user’s trust profile, establishing assurance that 
the user is in good standing, and providing additional assurance that the user has a need-
to-know when the controller protects need-to-know data. Note that affiliation exists in both 
an ACDataResourceAccess as a property and at a higher level in the trust profile (see Defn. 15). 
Affiliation attached to a subset of the trust profile indicates current affiliation, or whether 
the requestor is currently affiliated with the controller noted in the trust profile, while the 
affiliation property in an ACDataResourceAccess denotes whether the requestor was affiliated with the 
controller at the time of access. This is useful for situations when the affiliation was with a 




During a request for sensitive information, the context in which the request is made 
is important. Different requestors may have a legitimate need to request the same resource, 
but as access history is highly customized, the evaluation of trust profiles must 
accommodate a wide variety of entries. This requires the controller to be flexible in 
accepting the credential expressions generated for each attempted negotiation. For 
example, a family physician requesting a patient’s electronic health record from a specialist 
(e.g., cardiologist) the patient has seen recently can be reasonably expected to have entries 
in his/her personal trust profile showing a history of access to the patient’s records in the 
local EHR. However, a physician working in an ER is much less likely to be treating a 
patient he/she has seen before, but should be able to present a trust profile indicating the 
treatment of multiple patients in an ER setting. In support of this functionality, the trust 
profile model has definitions for a data resource DR = <DRDescriptor, DRID> with an associated 
type DRType  from Defns. 6a and 6b  coupled with a request context. The next definition 
pulls all of the concepts together to define a trust profile: 
Defn. 15: A Trust Profile, TP = <tpname, uid, tpAS, tpDRAS, tpDRCS,  tpSCS,  tpDW > where: 
 tpname is the name to identify the profile,  
 uid is the unique identity of a user,  
 tpAS is the Affiliation Set (AS) of ACs ACAffiliation from Defn. 14b that contains all 
of the user’s employment(s) or direct contact with the issuing organization, 
 tpDRAS is the Data Resource Access Set (DRAS) that contains a set of 
ACDataResourceAccess from Defn. 14a where each ACDataResourceAccess represents access by role 




 tpDRCS is the Data Resource Confidentiality Set (DRCS)  that contains a set of 
ACs ACDataResourceConfidentiality from Defn. 14c where each ACDataResourceConfidentiality represents the 
confidentiality of an accessed data resource, 
 tpSCS is the System Confidentiality Set (SCS) that contains a set of ACSystemConfidentiality 
from Defn. 14d where each ACSystemConfidentiality represents the confidentiality of a 
specific accessed system, and  
 tpDW is the Digital Wallet that contains a set of attribute certificates that are a 
subset of ACs from tpAS, tpDRAS, tpDRCS, and tpSCS that represents the credentials 
being submitted by the requestor. 
In support of the process, we conceptualize the Digital Wallet as the set of subject 
attributes the requestor (SARequestor) sends to be evaluated. The security agents SARequestor and 
SAController manage the disclosure of credentials for the duration of the negotiation. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.3, the Trust Profile is gradually released from SARequestor to SAController. The 
Trust Negotiation component receives the request for a resource and the Trust Profile from 
SAController. The resource is annotated with attributes of its own, represented by Resource 
Object Attributes in Figure 4.3, that include the Patient’s ID, the physician assigned to the 
patient as the Primary Physician, the patient’s Appointment Time, and the Sensitivity Level 
of the resource. When the Trust Negotiation component has received the credentials from 
the Trust Profile, the PDP attempts to match the subject attributes in the Trust Profile to 
the Resource Object Attributes and the Environment Conditions through ψ, which is 
created by the Trust Negotiation component from the Access Control Rules based on the 




resource from the Access Control Rules. The Sensitivity Level of the requestor is 
determined based on the type of resource being requested, the Role of the requestor, and 
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Figure 4.3. Integrated Trust Profile, ABAC, and Trust Negotiation. 
For example, suppose a DR is an EHR that contains mental health data tagged with 
a sensitivity level of V (see Table 2.1), indicating that the mental health data is considered 
very sensitive and must be treated with utmost care. The requestor is the patient’s 
psychiatrist and has multiple entries indicating access to the patient’s health records. The 
psychiatrist initiates a request for the EHR under the psychiatrist role. The credential 
expression, ψ, generated by the Trust Negotiation component, will allow access if the trust 
profile indicates previous treatment of the patient and the psychiatrist meets the required 
V sensitivity level. The Trust Negotiation component determines that the sensitivity level 




data under the psychiatrist role, has accessed the patient’s data specifically, and the patient 
is known to currently have an appointment with him/her. The psychiatrist’s trust profile 
fulfills the first two requirements, and the PDP indicates that the current time from the 
Environment Conditions matches an appointment noted in the patient’s records. The 
psychiatrist meets the sensitivity requirement, a new entry is made in the trust profile 
indicating successful access to the requested data, and the requested data is sent to the 
psychiatrist. The presented trust profile has fulfilled the requirements and the release 
actions LOG: High Risk and Dispatch Audit Notification are executed for the sensitivity 
level V transaction to provide further assurances of resource security, stored as part of 
AHR. 
The final set of definitions is for the interactions between the trust profile, the 
request context, and the credential expression during trust negotiation. 
Defn. 16: A Request Context, RC, is a three-tuple that combines the resource, trust 
profile, and role as: RC = < 𝐷𝑅, 𝑡𝑝 , 𝑟 > 
Defn. 17: The controller’s credential expression Cψ is a logical expression whose 
clauses correspond to credentials c that must be present in TP  to allow access to 
DR. 
Defn. 18: The controller’s set of release actions, RA, is defined as a set of actions for 
the controller to execute depending on the received credentials if the credential 
expression ψ is satisfied. 
Defn. 19: The credential expression ψ is satisfied iff the presented credentials have 




Defn. 20: A Transaction, T, is a series of data exchanges between Requestor and 
Controller, initiated by the Requestor with an RC, continues with disclosures of 
tpDW, and ends when the Controller determines trust cannot be established or 
when ψ is satisfied. If ψ is satisfied the Requestor receives a new entry in the trust 
profile, receives the requested data, and the Controller executes all actions in RA. 
Defn. 21: The Transaction, T, is valid iff ψ is satisfied and the controller has executed 
actions specified in RA: 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝑇) =  𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑐, 𝜓) +RA 
When a request for trust negotiation is initiated, the requestor creates a Request 
Context (Defn. 16), which consists of the resource (e.g., patient EHR, public health data, 
etc.) the requestor would like to access, initial trust profile data, and the role the requestor 
possesses in his/her trust profile and would like to use for the trust negotiation. Using the 
request context, the controller creates a credential expression that represents the constraints 
that the trust profile must satisfy to obtain access to the requested resource. The controller 
may also take other actions depending on which constraints are satisfied. For instance, a 
family physician seeing a new patient may not have an access history in the trust profile 
indicating past treatment. A trust profile that has an affiliation with an organization but no 
previous interaction with the patient may result in a decision to allow access and send a 
notification to the controller’s organization’s auditor that the transaction requires review. 
During the trust negotiation procedure, a subset of the trust profile chosen by the 
requestor acts as a set of credentials whose release is negotiated during trust negotiation. 
Each record of access in the access history forms one credential. Once a base level of trust 




subsets of the trust profile to satisfy the remaining portions of the controller’s credential 
expression to obtain access to data. The controller’s credential expression is generated 
subject to the data being requested and the role the requestor possesses for the session. If 
the requestor is able to satisfy the controller’s credential expression and access is obtained, 
the controller adds its own entries to the user’s trust profile that can satisfy the requirements 
of future attempts at trust negotiation with any other controller. Additionally, the controller 
may take other actions depending on the credentials presented, such as calculating 
transformations (addition, modification, deletion, etc.) on the data or dispatching audit 
notifications. Figure 4.3 illustrates a modification of the ABAC model from Figure 2.1 that 
incorporates the trust profile and trust negotiation. The credential expression, ψ, shown in 
Figure 4.3 is the policy that ABAC enforces which involves confidentiality and role. 
In our model, as introduced in Defn. 5:, ψ represents the credential expression as in 
(Winsborough, Seamons, & Jones, 2000). In addition, we also create a set of release actions 
RA  (Defn. 18) that the controller will perform depending on how ψ is satisfied. RA  and ψ 
are created dynamically based on the request context the controller receives to ensure that 
its requirements for access match the resource being requested and the user’s role. The RA 
may detail actions including but not limited to: logging, audit notifications, data redaction, 
data addition, or data modification. During trust negotiation, the controller attempts to 
minimize the risk present in the transaction by obtaining as many relevant credentials as 
possible until all of its requirements have been satisfied. The RA present in the model 
allows the controller to ascertain the amount of risk in the transaction and act accordingly 




resource to reduce risk. This approach allows trust negotiation to obtain a higher success 
rate without compromising security. 
4.3. Healthcare Example 
In this section, we present a healthcare example that describes the interactions 
between the user (requestor) and the healthcare organization’s controller involving the use 
of the trust profile as trust negotiation credentials, the validation of the trust profile’s 
legitimacy, and the dissemination of new trust profile entries. A representation of Dr. 
Jane’s current trust profile is shown in the inner box of Figure 4.4. Dr. Jane is a physician 
working at Family Health Center (FHC) and has previously obtained access to sensitive 
data at St. Francis Hospital (SFH). Her trust profile contains entries from both FHC and 
SFH. She possesses two X.509 identity certificates, one from each FHC and SFH displayed 
in the upper half of Dr. Jane’s current trust profile in Figure 4.4. Each of the identity 
certificates has one or more attribute certificates attached to it, each attribute certificate 
describing one specific aspect of access to sensitive data under the physician role. Since 
she is an employee of FHC, her access to the EHR of FHC is unrestricted with improper 
data access being determined by local RBAC policies and security audits of the EHR’s 
access logs. Since Jane is personally known to FHC and has had her personal identity 
manually vetted through FHCs hiring process, FHC endorses her trustworthiness by 
maintaining a current ACAffiliation certificate present in Jane’s trust profile. Sensitive data from 
SFH was previously obtained through successful trust negotiation, resulting in additional 
trust profile entries. Jane’s trust profile is stored remotely on trusted FHC servers and 






Figure 4.4. Dr. Jane’s Trust Profile. 
Jane is seeing her patient at FHC who recently had an EKG taken at the Henry Low 
Heart Center at Hartford Hospital (HH) and needs the patient’s updated healthcare record 
with the EKG for follow up treatment. Jane has never had previous contact with HH for 
healthcare records, and HH has no previous contact with Jane or knowledge of her status 
as a physician with FHC. Jane is able to locate her patient’s new EKG data through the use 
of a master patient index (MPI) and discovers that HH has a copy of her patient’s EKG. 
Through the mHealth application on Jane’s mobile device provided by FHC, Jane makes a 
request for trust negotiation to HH’s controller to access her patient’s EKG.  The process 
of testing trust credentials starts in step 1 and continues in time from top to bottom in Figure 
4.5. 
 Jane initiates a secure connection to HH’s controller and creates an RC. Recall 
from Defn. 16: that an RC consists of a data resource DR, the digital wallet tpDW for the 
first round of trust negotiation, and the Role r that Jane would like to use to access the 




  𝐷𝑅 = < 𝐷𝑅  , 𝐷𝑅 > 
 𝑡𝑝 = < 𝐼𝐶 , 𝐴𝐶 > 
 RC  = < DR, tpDW, rfamily physician > 
 
Jane’s mobile device communicates with her security agent SARequestor running on a 
server maintained by FHC to send the RC, shown in step 1 in the upper left of Figure 4.5. 
SARequestor serves the purpose of offloading memory intensive and computationally expensive 
cryptographic operations required for trust negotiation from the mobile device as supported 
in surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003). Offloading management of trust profile 
disclosure to the security agent also improves security, as the trust profile will not be found 
on the mobile device in the case that it is lost or stolen. Recall that the security agent is 
responsible for managing the disclosure of Jane’s credentials from her trust profile stored 
in the cloud. Jane selects a subset of her trust profile that describes her current employment 
with FHC under the family physician role. The mHealth application collects the specific 
certificates that describe the subset of the trust profile that Dr. Jane has selected and 
packages their certificate chains into a digital wallet tpDW. The RC is then sent to the 
controller of HH’s EHR, shown in step 2 of Figure 4.5. 
HH’s controller’s security agent SAController receives the RC and examines Dr. Jane’s 
request to compile an appropriate set of credentials to determine whether Dr. Jane is 
trustworthy and should be granted access to the requested patient EKG. This collection of 
trust negotiation credentials that the controller requires to release the requested data is 




in step 3 of Figure 4.5, based on DRtype and rfamily physician. The controller decides that the 
request will be accepted if the requestor possesses the following credentials: 
 The requestor has at least one credential ACAffiliation indicating current employment and 
manual security vetting of the trust profile owner. 
 The requestor has at least three credentials ACDataResourceConfidentiality N indicating access to 
healthcare records of at least sensitivity level N. 
 The requestor has at least three credentials ACDataResourceAccess where r = physician indicating 
record access under the physician role. 
Additionally, the request will be considered a lower risk transaction if the requestor 
possesses credentials indicating: 
 The requestor has at least 3 credentials that indicate access to healthcare records of the 
patient listed in DRID. 
 There is at least one credential indicating access to the patient’s healthcare records 
within the last year 𝐴𝐶  = 2019. 
And the controller’s release actions RA: 
 If the credential expression is satisfied but the additional requirements are not, the 
controller will release the data but will note the transaction in a high risk log and 
dispatch a notification to the controller’s auditor that a high-risk transaction has 
occurred. 
 If the credential expression is satisfied but only one of the additional requirements is 




 If the credential expression is satisfied and both additional requirements are met, 
transaction is noted in low risk log. 
The controller then begins the validation process for the certificates in the tpDW. 
First, the controller requires proof that the sender of the certificates is also the owner of the 
certificates and that the entries in the trust profile describe the sender’s access history. The 
controller determines ownership by sending a cryptographic challenge, shown in step 4 of 
Figure 4.5, encrypted with the public key listed in the associated identity certificates to the 
requestor, in this case Dr. Jane. Dr. Jane possesses the private key associated with the 
identity certificates, so her SARequestor is able to respond to the cryptographic challenge and 
signs the response with the private key before sending it back to the HH controller, shown 
in step 5. The HH controller, now satisfied that it is in communication with the trust 
profile’s owner, begins the process of validating the information within the certificates 
(step 6). First, the controller examines the issuer signature of the leaf identity certificate. 
The controller retrieves the public key of the issuer from the next certificate in the chain in 
the CA certificate, in this case the signing certificate owned by FHC. The public key is 
used to retrieve the hash of the leaf identity certificate in the digital signature signed by 
FHC’s CA certificate. The controller computes the hash of the leaf identity certificate and 
compares it to the CA’s signed hash. If the hashes match, the controller knows that the data 
in the identity certificate is the same data signed by FHC if FHC’s CA certificate is also 
valid and unaltered. Validation continues by validating FHC’s CA certificate. The 
controller checks if FHC’s CA certificate is in HH’s local trusted certificate store. Since 
HH does not trust FHC directly, FHC’s CA certificate is not in the certificate store so 




authority’s certificate is retrieved, the signature of the FHC CA certificate is inspected, and 
the FHC CA certificate is found to be valid. The root medical authority’s certificate is 
found in HH’s local trusted certificate store, so the entire certificate chain is valid and 
Jane’s identity certificates have been verified. The attribute certificates are validated with 
the same process, in addition to the controller checking to ensure each attribute certificate 
is associated with a valid X.509 identity certificate. 
The digital wallet released to the controller thus far has only satisfied the affiliation 
requirement in the credential expression. The controller sends the SGP to Jane (step 7) 
listing remaining necessary credentials, including both those required for access and those 
required to consider the transaction low risk. In healthcare, the SGP is crucial to control 
access to sensitive medical data on patients by alerting the physician to the access history 
in the trust profile that is necessary to access the medical data. Without the SGP, the 
physician has no method to determine the type of health record access history the controller 
requires. It is necessary to alert the physician to the exact credentials required as the trust 
profile can become arbitrarily long and the physician must be able to complete the trust 
negotiation attempt quickly. Jane’s trust agent receives the request (step 7). Jane reads the 
request (step 8) and decides to release the three latest records of access (step 9) to the 
patient’s healthcare record in her trust profile and credentials indicating her confidentiality 
level. Her trust agent collects the certificates describing these access records, places them 
in a tpDW, and sends them to the HH controller (step 10). 
 𝐴𝐶 = < 𝐼𝐶 , 𝑑𝑠 , 𝐴𝐶 , 2020,   𝑢 , 𝑟 , 𝑑𝑟 , 𝑠𝑦𝑠 > 




The controller receives Dr. Jane’s credentials (step 11) and issues its cryptographic 
challenge to determine ownership (step 12). The trust agent answers the challenge (step 
13). The controller checks that the credentials reference the correct patient, and checks the 
timestamps to determine if any of the accesses have occurred within the last year. Since 
the subset of Jane’s credentials the controller holds now satisfy all of the controller’s 
requirements (step 14), the controller decides to release the requested health data to Jane 
and considers the transaction to be low risk. The low risk status allows full data disclosure 
and the transaction is logged in a low-risk transaction log, fulfilling the RA requirements. 
The controller processes the EKG to be sent to Dr. Jane by converting it to a standard 
interchange format and preparing it for transfer using the FHIR standard. HH’s controller 
requests that Dr. Jane either send an X.509 identity certificate signed by HH’s controller 
or generate a new private/public key pair and send the new public key (step 15). Dr. Jane 
doesn’t currently possess an X.509 identity certificate from HH so she generates the new 
key pair and sends the public key in a CSR as requested (step 16). HH’s controller receives 
the public key and generates a new X.509 certificate, signs it, and creates attribute 
certificates describing the current access to the EKG (step 17). HH’s controller then sends 
the EKG and the new trust profile entries to Dr. Jane over the secure connection (step 18). 
Dr. Jane receives the trust profile entries, adds them to her trust profile, and is now able to 
examine the EKG (step 19). The trust negotiation process is now complete and the 
connection is terminated. Should Dr. Jane already possess an X.509 identity certificate 
from HH, the process remains the same except HH only generates the attribute certificates 




now encompasses the entire trust profile present in Figure 4.4, including the certificates 
issued by HH. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Healthcare Example Sequence Diagram. 
To illustrate the flexibility of the controller’s requirements, suppose that Jane is 
unable to produce a credential indicating previous access of the patient’s health records 
because her patient typically sees another physician at the same hospital. In this case, the 
controller’s requirements for the data are met, but the transaction is considered by the 
controller to be a higher risk because the physician lacks a history indicating treatment of 




previous history of healthcare data access under the physician role and current affiliation 
with a healthcare organization, but since the controller is unable to obtain assurance that 
Jane has had past interactions with the patient, the transaction is logged in a high risk audit 
log and the controller’s security auditor receives a notification that the high risk transaction 
has occurred. This allows Jane timely access to the data with a reasonable level of assurance 
that the transaction is appropriate while allowing the auditor to react swiftly to the 
transaction if a mistake has occurred. 
4.4. Related Work 
The security and flexibility of trust negotiation has resulted in a variety of 
adaptations to the healthcare domain and online business, in conjunction with mobile 
devices. In (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, & Seamons, 2005), the authors create a 
framework for adaptive trust negotiation targeting trust establishment between unknown 
users and online businesses through integrating TrustBuilder and the GAA-API. Trust is 
established utilizing credentials accumulated through past purchases online, with users 
being authorized to make larger purchases online if they are able to present a history of 
past successful purchases. Users are assigned a score by the business’ controller based on 
both the quantity and dollar amount of past purchases and the score determines whether 
the current transaction can be trusted to be fulfilled by the user. The required level of trust 
also fluctuates depending on the number of requests received by a single requestor to guard 
against slowing the system with a denial-of-service attack composed of repeated failed trust 
negotiation attempts. This approach of tracking users’ past purchases is similar to our 
approach of accumulating a set of historical access to sensitive healthcare data, which 




allowing for more depth in which credentials are specified, which properties of the 
credentials are most relevant, customizing the credential requirements based on the user’s 
role, and customizing the controller’s response to a trust negotiation request. 
In the healthcare domain, (Mavridis, Georgiadis, Pangalos, & Khair, 2001) 
provides a methodology for applying access control to EHR data through the use of 
attribute based access control utilizing a certificate system similar to the one presented 
here. Unlike our approach where the user possesses the certificates detailing attributes 
directly, the authors use an identity based approach. Each user obtains an identity certificate 
and is also provided with an appropriate set of short-lived attribute certificates. These 
certificates provide credentials that the access control policy reads to determine sensitive 
data access, including the concept of a user location defined by: the actual device the user 
operates to initiate the request, the user’s administrative domain that determines how it 
reacts to the request based on group policies (e.g., different departments within the 
hospital), and a context parameter that detects a need-to-know requirement (e.g., physicians 
may only read data on patients they have been assigned). Access is based on a tuple 
consisting of the user’s role and location, which grants permissions to access a data set 
under an access mode. This approach mirrors our approach with regards to the usage of 
credentials encoded in identity and attribute certificates but lacks methods of accumulating 
credentials over a period of time, which is a key feature of our approach and lacks the 
adaptiveness of providing multiple levels of trust which we also offer. 
The application of trust negotiation for healthcare was introduced in (Vawdrey, 
Sundelin, Seamons, & Knutson, 2003). In this paper, the authors describe an EHR capable 




underlying medical data. The controller responds to requests for health data only by 
requesting the physician’s medical license which is provided by a medical association. 
While our approach is also healthcare focused and depends on the user possessing a 
verifiable set of credentials, we have expanded the set of credentials beyond the usage of a 
medical license to a complete set of access history in the trust profile. Additionally, the 
controller is capable of adapting the security policies to both the type of request and the 
requestor. 
Surrogate trust negotiation (Sundelin, July 2003) is also provided as a method for 
adapting trust negotiation to the healthcare field since healthcare data is often accessed via 
mobile device. The more cryptographically intensive functions such as validating 
certificates and sending responses to cryptographic challenges are offloaded to a trusted 
server provided by the hospital that employs the physician. We have incorporated the 
concept of a trust agent introduced in this paper into our model, allowing a trust profile 
owner to determine the way that the trust profile is stored. The communication between 
the user’s trust agent, which manages trust profile credential disclosure for the user, and 
the controller’s trust agent, which manages the controller’s own credential disclosures and 
forwards an SGP to the user to communicate which trust profile disclosures are required, 
forms the basis for credential disclosure in our approach. 
The application for healthcare is further enhanced in (Elkhodr, Shahrestani, & 
Cheung, 2011) by creating a trust negotiation protocol for verifying access to remote 
healthcare sensors placed in the home of the patient. The Ubiquitous Health Trust Protocol 
(UHTP) is created to allow physicians to authorize themselves, the device they use, and 




to be monitored continuously from a healthcare professional from the comfort of their own 
home. Similar to our approach, the UHTP defines multiple credentials, building trust if the 
user is: authenticated with the local EHR, utilizing an approved mobile device, and located 
within a certain distance of the remote sensors being accessed. In comparison, our approach 
is different in three ways: it is more adaptive and allows multiple levels of trust to be 
attained depending on the credentials presented; contains a more expansive set of 
credentials consisting of the user’s entire sensitive data access history; and, doesn’t require 







Dynamic Adaptive Trust Negotiation Framework 
In this chapter, we describe the dynamic adaptive trust negotiation framework that 
includes all of the infrastructure that is necessary to design and implement the trust profile 
concepts from Chapter 3 and the model of Chapter 4 into a framework to realize trust 
negotiation.  The discussion of the framework in this chapter supports Contribution D: 
Dynamic Adaptive Trust Negotiation Framework by:  
1. defining and describing all of the necessary concepts that are required to 
implement the model of Chapter 4 using the resource in Defns. 6a and 6b;   
2. augmenting the discussion of every concept to customize the discussion of 
each concept which essentially constitutes a way that the resource concepts 
can be transitioned into FHIR resources;  and,  
3. illustrating each of the concepts by continuing and extending the example 
presented in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4.  
The main concepts of the dynamic adaptive trust negotiation framework are: 
 Security objects (sec objects) that are created based on the data requested, 
the trust profile entries required, and the validated trust profile entires 
exchanged during trust negotiation that fulfill the trust profile requirements.  
 Security Metadata that is divided into four concepts: system security 
metadata, resource type security metadata, resource security metadata, and 




 Security Object Structure that creates a tree for each Sec object that contains 
the specific credentials that must be presented to the controller. 
 Request Resolution which describes how multiple Sec objects are combined 
to ensure security at each identified security level from the four Security 
Metadata concepts. 
 Controller Configuration which describes the way that the controller is 
configured to accept certain collections of credentials on a per-role basis. 
This chapter consists of 2 sections. Section 5.1 discusses the contents, structure, and useage 
of a security object in detail. Section 5.2 discusses the configuration of a security object 
and the metadata, specified in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format, required to build 
a security object. All of the concepts discussed in both Sections 5.1 and 5.2. support 
expected Contribution C: Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies and 
Contribution D: Trust Negotiation Development Framework. 
5.1. Security Objects  
In this section, we introduce the concept of a security object, Sec object, which acts 
as a repository to capture the relationship between the data requested, the trust profile 
entries required, and the validated trust profile entries exchanged during trust negotiation 
that fulfill the trust profile requirements. Recall from Chapter 4 that the trust profile’s 
attribute certificate types track: the associated identity certificate, the attribute certificate 
issuer, and a timestamp. The attribute certificate types are: data resource access certificates 
(ACDataResourceAccess), affiliation certificates (ACAffiliation), data resource confidentiality certificates 




14c, and 14d, respectively.  The data resource DR  of a particular system S  requires a set 
of access certificates AC that provide metadata on the role the user possessed during the 
access, a DRID, and the SID representing system S (e.g., an EHR or a FHIR server in the 
healthcare domain) that serviced the originating request. Affiliation certificates denote that 
a user is a current employee with a trusted healthcare provider which implies a thorough 
manual background check as part of the pre-employment process. The data resource 
confidentiality certificate provides the confidentiality level of the resource accessed DRID, 
within the system SID. The system confidentiality certificate describes the highest level of 
confidentiality that the certificate subject has accessed on the system SName with SID. 
The controller (Defn. 3) first receives a request context RC (Defn. 16) consisting of 
the requested DR (Defn. 6b), the digital wallet (Defn. 15), and role r (Defn. 8) for trust 
profile based trust negotiation. The controller creates one or more Sec objects. Each Sec 
object is responsible for matching verified trust profile credentials to security requirements 
at a pre-defined security level that corresponds to collections of sensitive data. These 
security levels are identified when trust profile support is added to a server’s authentication 
and authorization options. The first security level encompasses the entire server, with each 
lower security level configured with stricter requirements for a more specific subset of 
data. In order to obtain access to the requested object, the requestor’s trust profile entries 
must satisfy the requirements of the Sec objects at each level. We define a single Sec object 
as being satisfied when a subset of the trust profile credentials shared with the controller 
by the requestor R contains the Access History Properties AHP (Defn. 9) with the values 




is divided into one of four identified levels, whose various access rules are combined 
utilizing the process described in Section 5.1.5 to form one credential expression for the 
entire trust negotiation process. Recall from Chapter 2 Section 3 that FHIR categorizes 
resources into one of many types of resources. These four security levels are: 
 System security metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.1 refers to the requirements 
that the controller must observe in the requestor’s trust profile to gain access to any 
resources on S. 
 Resource type security metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.2 refers to the protection 
of an individual type of resource. 
 Resource security metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.3 refers to the protection of 
an individual resource instance on S and the data within the resource. 
 Consent metadata to be discussed in Section 5.1.4 refers to the ability of a patient to 
describe which healthcare providers may access each resource that describes the 
patient. 
In support of trust profile integration, we have created a front end to a RESTful 
implementation to enable the creation of a credential expression, through the creation of 
Sec objects, whose access rules are created based on a pre-defined configuration, to be 
specified in Section 5.2, and reactive to the requestor’s role and the trust profile entries 
received.  This metadata describes the properties needed in the requestor’s trust profile to 
obtain authorization to a resource on a per-role basis. The modifications support the 
creation of an adaptive credential expression that accepts multilple sets of trust profile 




the configuration specifies release actions RA for each set of credentials that may satisfy 
the generated credential expression. 
Each Sec object is organized into a tree structure as illustrated with the SecResource Type 
example in Figure 5.1 detailing the specific credentials that must be presented to the 
controller on a per role basis, as well as release actions required for the release of the 
resource based on which parts of the credential expression are satisfied. The root of the tree 
contains an identifier that defines the type of Sec object, depicted in Figure 5.1 as the 
subscript in the purple rectangle on the left side. The SecSystem, SecResource Type, SecResource, and SecConsent 
objects protect, respectively, the involved system SID, an identified data resource type 
DRType of that system, an associated data resource DRID (e.g., an ID of the patient FHIR 
resource), or the consent of the data’s owner (e.g., a patient). A Sec object ID, represented 
as the gray oval in the bottom left of Figure 5.1, notes a unique identifier for the actual 
instance of the resource being protected (e.g., a system ID, the resource type’s name, a 
numeric identifier for the individual resource, etc.). The next level of the tree represented 
by the branches connected to the SecResource Type rectangle in Figure 5.1, provides a supported 
list of roles capable of retrieving data of the requested Sec object. For example, a SecSystem 
object contains a complete listing of all of the roles that are able to access any sensitive 
data protected by the controller, whereas SecResource Type for an Observation FHIR resource will 
only contain the roles that are capable of accessing a resource of the Observation type. 
Each role contains subtrees representing a set of AHPs, shown as green rectangles 
connected to the roles in Figure 5.1, that the controller must request from the requestor’s 




with multiple sets of AHPs with differing requirements and release actions. The Sec 
object’s security requirements are satisfied if one set of AHPs specified in the configuration 
has been matched to the presented trust profile credentials (e.g., the Sec object requires 
trust profile credentials noting access to the patient’s record within the last year, and a trust 
profile credential indicating access to the patient’s record within the last year is presented). 
The existence of multiple sets of AHPs allows more flexibility in the ability to build trust 
between the requestor and controller by requesting multiple combinations of AHPs, which 
provides a baseline for AHPs that must be present for the controller to trust the requestor 
with the release of the requested resource object. 
Each set of AHPs has an optional set of release actions (RAs) represented by the 
blue rectangles attached to the AHPs that describes ancillary actions the controller must 
take to approve the satisfaction of the AHP requirement by a credential in the requestor’s 
trust profile. The RA for an AHP optionally has: potential additions, modifications, or 
redactions of the resource before release to the requestor; or specifies side effect actions 
such as noting the release of the resource at certain risk levels in a multi-level audit log and 
dispatching audit notifications to the healthcare organization’s local security auditor for 
immediate review. Additions to the resource include contextual data not requested but 
necessary to understand the resource, e.g., a program for reading X-Ray scans. 
Modifications to the resource include changes such as translating embedded data into a 
standard format. Redactions may occur if the requestor’s credentials meet a trust level 
sufficient to access parts of a resource, but not the entire resource. In this case, the sensitive 




is authorized to access. Integrating an RA into a resource is a method that the controller 
uses to increase the rate of trust negotiation success and disseminate requested PHI without 
compromising patient security. The remainder of this section consists of Sections 5.1.1 to 
5.1.5, which correspond to the concepts: System Security metadata, Resource Type 
Security metadata, Resource Security metadata, Consent metadata, and Request 
Resolution. 
 
Figure 5.1. SecResource Type Object Example Structure. 
5.1.1. System Security Metadata  
System security (SecSystem) metadata refers to the requirements the controller must 
observe in the requestor’s trust profile to gain access to any resources protected by the 
system. This may include a valid affiliation certificate (Defn. 14b) denoting current 
employment at a trusted healthcare provider and at least one data resource access certificate 
(Defn. 14a) describing access to a resource under the role requested for the current trust 




user has been granted on a specific system. As specified in the trust profile model, an 
identity certificate in a trust profile may have a system confidentiality attribute certificate 
(Defn. 14d) attached to it that records the highest security clearance previously granted to 
the trust profile owner by the specific system that signed it. This certificate is replaced with 
a newer certificate listing a higher clearance in the event that the controller grants the 
requestor access to a resource with a higher listed security clearance than the clearance 
listed in the requestor’s system confidentiality attribute certificate. The requestor may be 
assigned higher security clearances by the controller depending on which trust profile 
entries the requestor sends to satisfy the generated credential expression. An ACSystemConfidentiality 
certificate previously digitally signed by the controller may be provided during negotiation 
to claim a previous confidentiality level assigned by the controller. A system 
confidentiality level may be assigned based on the perceived damage caused by a potential 
unauthorized leak of the requested data. A requestor that meets the confidentiality 
requirements for portions of the requested resource, but not the entire resource, may result 
in a release action (RA) (Defn. 18) that causes the controller to filter data of higher 
sensitivity from the resource before sending it to the requestor.  
The system security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a front 
end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation in a 
number of steps. SecSystem represents the base requirements for any request made to the HAPI 
FHIR server. When trust negotiation with a HAPI FHIR instance is requested, the SecSystem 
object is created based on the role the user chooses to represent the set of trust profile 
requirements to access the HAPI FHIR API. Any request to the HAPI FHIR instance that 




underlying EHR. Figure 5.2 shows an example configuration of a SecSystem object for the 
Primary Care Physician, Nurse, and Accident and Emergency doctor roles. These 
configurations require that each role has a current affiliation certificate (Defn. 14b). 
Additionally, with no other credentials or overrides from the other Sec objects, the request 
would be logged as a high risk transaction and an audit notification would be dispatched to 
the auditor account located at “security@bmi9.engr.uconn.edu”. 
 
 




5.1.2. Resource Type Security Metadata 
Resource type security (SecResource Type) metadata refers to the protection of all of the 
resources of a given type (e.g. resource types in the FHIR standard, which are further 
divided into foundation, base, clinical, financial, and specialized resource types (HL7 
International, 2019)). Each resource type possesses an associated security object that 
describes the credentials that must be presented by the requestor for the controller to release 
a resource of the given type. The required credentials are described by a series of Access 
History Properties (AHP), each describes a single property of access to a sensitive resource. 
These credentials are also organized within the security object by the role the requestor 
assumes for the given trust negotiation transaction. Recall that (Sanzi et al., 2017) specifies 
that in the initial request for trust profile based trust negotiation, the requestor specifies the 
role (e.g., family physician, emergency room physician, nurse, billing agent, front desk 
secretary, etc.) to be assumed for the purposes of negotiation. The controller filters the 
resources a requestor of a given role accesses based on the perceived needs of a role. For 
example, a physician role will be allowed to access clinical resources (e.g., summary, 
diagnostics, medications, care provisions, request and responses) whereas a front desk 
secretary may be limited to the patient resource (describing the patient’s demographic data) 
under the base category. The role specified by the requestor will also affect the proof the 
controller requests for assurance of the requestor’s membership of the specified role. A 
family physician requesting a patient’s clinical resources may be asked to provide 
credentials from the trust profile indicating a historical access to the patient’s clinical 
resources whereas a front desk secretary may only have to provide proof of employment 




The resource type security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a 
front end into  FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation in 
a number of steps. SecResource Type represents the requirements to access an object of the requested 
type from the HAPI FHIR instance. If the requestor were to request a FHIR Observation 
resource from the controller, the controller retrieves a SecResource Type for the Observation 
resource that contains the set of Access History Properties required in the trust profile to 
obtain access to any resource of an Observation type. If a requestor wishes to retrieve an 
Observation resource, at this level the requestor must: satisfy the SecSystem for HAPI FHIR 
API access and satisfy the SecResource Type for Observation resource access. Figure 5.3 shows an 
example SecResource Type configuration for a SecResource Type object for an Observation resource. The 
displayed role, for the physician, is required to show a current affiliation (Defn. 14b) as 
well as satisfy one of the two sets of properties noted under the “properties” array. Note 
that more roles are listed at this level in the JSON structure in Figure 5.3 in the same manner 
as in Figure 5.2 but are omitted for brevity. The physician’s properties array contains two 
AHP (Defn. 9) sets: one at the top whose satisfaction results in a high amount of trust, and 
one at the bottom whose satisfaction results in a mid level of trust. The high trust AHP set 
requires 3 (quantity property) trust profile entries within 3 years of the current date (period 
property), with the role of physician (role property), with the patient’s ID for those trust 
profile entries matching the one for the Observation (patient property), and the trust profile 
entries must be Observations (resource-type property) with a clearance of TS (resource-
clearance property). Should all of these requirements be met by the presented trust profile, 
the requestor gains a high level of trust, the transaction does not require an audit, and the 




trust AHP set only requires one entry within the last year, with the patient’s ID, only 
requires access to the Patient resource (containing patient demographics), requires only a 
resource-clearance of S, and results in logging the transaction as a mid level risk. 
 
 




5.1.3. Resource Security Metadata 
Resource security (SecResource) metadata protects an individual resource object on the 
a server and the data within the object.  The resource SecResource provides security data for is 
identified within the SecResource by a matching the identifier presented in the Data Resource 
(Defn. 6b) of the Request Context (Defn. 16). SecResource is similar to SecResource Type with the 
exception that it protects an individual resource instance as contrasted to an entire 
collection of resources of a certain type, increasing the granularity with which a resource 
is protected. When the request for a resource through trust negotiation is first received by 
the controller, the SecResource object attached to the requested object is retrieved by matching 
the object’s ID to the SecResource ID. 
The resource security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a front 
end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. SecResource 
represents the requirements to access the specific FHIR resource object identified in the 
initial data request. The SecResource is retrieved via a FHIR ID and provides security for an 
individual FHIR resource instance. When a requestor requests a resource, at this level the 
requestor must satisfy: the SecSystem for HAPI FHIR API access, the SecResource Type for Observation 
resource access, and the SecResource object for access to the specific resource requested. Figure 
5.4 shows an example configuration for a specific Observation resource, identified by the 






Figure 5.4. An Example SecResource Configuration. 
5.1.4. Consent Security Metadata 
Consent security (SecConsent) metadata allows for a data owner to provide input as to 
which requestors may access each resource owned. A SecConsent is retrieved during trust 
negotiation by matching the ID of the owner described by the resource with the ID of the 
SecConsent object. Additionally, a SecConsent object provides support for listing an arbitrary list of 
trust profile identity certificates whose owners can access the object regardless of the 
requirements listed in the Consent object. This allows explicit access to the object should 
the data owner know of a user that should be able to access the object, even if the 
organization maintaining the controller does not. Identity certificates are uniquely 
identified by a combination of issuer and serial number, and a public key must be listed for 




The consent security metadata of the framework can be integrated through a front 
end into FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. A SecConsent 
of type Patient allows the patient whose medical data is described by the requested resource 
to have input as to which healthcare providers may access the resource. Our SecConsent security 
object is based on the principles of patient consent (The Office of the National Coordinator 
for Health Information Technology, 2019) outlined by The Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC). Patient consent methods allow 
patients to consent to HIE among multiple healthcare providers by allowing patients to note 
when and how their health data is shared whether their health data is shared for treatment, 
bill payment, or general healthcare operations. Our patient consent object can override 
other security objects when present, allowing the patient to have final authority over the 
disclosure of the health record. The SecConsent object is built by the patient and attached to the 
patient’s records within a FHIR system, allowing the patient to provide input as to which 
trust profile credentials are necessary during trust negotiation for the release of the patient’s 
FHIR resources. 
The patient interacts with the SecConsent object via a patient portal provided by the 
healthcare organization maintaining the FHIR server. The patient portal follows the ONC’s 
meaningful consent guidelines (The Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology, 2018) and describes the patient’s choices as well as the 
implication of their options regarding what data will be released to which types of providers 
under different circumstances. The patient portal interface provided by the healthcare 
organization presents multiple options that cover different use cases along with 




depending on the options chosen. This simplifies the selection process for a patient, 
allowing the patient to fully comprehend the implications of each choice without requiring 
a deep understanding of trust profiles or trust negotiation. At the healthcare provider’s 
discretion, more granular interfaces can be made available to the patient should the patient 
have the knowledge to construct more detailed SecConsent objects. The SecConsent object contains 
the same format as the SecResource and SecResource Type objects with the restriction that a SecConsent object 
is only attached to a FHIR resource via ID if the resource’s patient identifier matches the 
identifier of the patient creating the SecConsent object. Additionally, the patient may include 
multiple instances of a healthcare professional’s public key from a trust profile identity 
certificate. This allows the patient to identify a healthcare professional as being able to 
access the patient’s healthcare records if the patient has a pre-existing relationship. If an 
identity certificate is listed as a potential credential to gain access to a FHIR resource, the 
healthcare professional attempting to access the resource proves ownership of the public 
key by proving ownership of the associated private key. This is done by digitally signing a 
message with the private key during trust negotiation in accordance with public key 
infrastructure. This feature allows patients to name specific healthcare workers that should 
be able to access their records, such as in the case of being treated by multiple physicians 
known to the patient, each providing one specific aspect of treatment. 
Figure 5.5 shows an example SecConsent configuration that belongs to a patient with an 
ID of 13. Although the patient has not specified any AHP sets, the patient has explicitly 
allowed a physician with the matching certificate listed in the “direct-consent” object to 
access any healthcare record that describes the patient. The physician can satisfy the SecConsent 




serial number and responding to a cryptographic challenge constructed with the listed 
public key. A successful response indicates that the requestor owns the listed identity 
certificate. This allows patients to formally specify their own physicians or other healthcare 
professionals as having access to their healthcare records. Although the properties list is 
empty in this example, patients can specify constraints on their healthcare data by requiring 
trust profile entries utilizing the same format for the properties objects as in the examples 
listed in Figures 5.2 through 5.4. 
 
 




5.1.5. Request Resolution 
Conceptually, each AHP listed in a Sec object represents an entry required to exist 
in the requestor’s trust profile that proves successful, secure handling of the type of Sec 
object by the role. The healthcare organization that shares the PHI is responsible for 
determining the AHPs necessary to determine whether a requestor is trustworthy. A 
requestor making a request under a family physician role for their patient’s EHR data 
located at a remote healthcare organization could result in the following requested AHPs 
and RAs: 
 SecSystem: Affiliation with any healthcare provider (RA: log as high risk). 
 SecResource Type: Past access to a resource of the same type within the last year (RA: reduce log 
level to medium risk, redact resource data with sensitivity: S or higher). 
 SecResource: Optional: Past access to a resource belonging to the patient within the last two 
years (RA: reduce log level to low risk, audit notification not required, no redaction 
required). 
 SecConsent: Affiliation with a listed healthcare provider (RA: notify patient of access through 
a healthcare portal). 
The request resolution of the framework can be integrated through a front end into FHIR 
resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. The Sec object structure 
identifiers and AHP sets represent resources in the FHIR standard. The SecSystem identifier is 
the FHIR RESTful URL where trust negotiation is initiated with the controller. The SecResource 




MedicationStatement. The SecResource identifier is a FHIR ID that uniquely identifies the FHIR 
resource. The SecConsent identifier is the ID of the patient whose healthcare data is represented 
by the FHIR object. AHP (Defn. 9) sets describe trust profile entries noting access to 
sensitive healthcare data, such as the type of data accessed, when the data was accessed, 
and the specific patient whose data was accessed. 
When a request for trust negotiation is initially received, the controller first retrieves 
the metadata utilizing the Request Context (Defn. 16) for each of the four Sec objects that 
will be associated with the request: the system metadata for the FHIR installation as a 
whole, the resource type metadata for the type of resource being requested (Defn. 6a), the 
resource metadata identified by the data resource request (Defn. 6b), and, the consent 
metadata associated with the data owner. Each Sec object’s requirements constructed 
through the retrieved metadata must be satisfied by one or more credentials sent by the 
requestor to determine the requestor’s trustworthiness. When the controller receives a 
requestor’s trust profile credential and has finished verifying the credential’s authenticity, 
an attempt is made to match it against the AHPs in each of the four retrieved Sec objects. 
The controller records which of the AHPs has been satisfied, and creates an SGP based on 
which AHPs remain unsatisfied to send back to the requestor. All of the four Sec objects 
must be satisfied for the trust negotiation to be successful. A Sec object is satisfied if one 
of its AHP sets is satisfied. A single trust profile credential is potentially capable of 
satisfying multiple AHPs across multiple Sec objects. During credential exchange, the 
controller is continually checking the requestor’s credentials and matching them to the Sec 




credential. If the requestor chooses not to send another credential, the controller checks 
whether all of the four Sec objects are satisfied, executes the release actions, and provides 
the resource and new trust profile credentials. The controller’s final set of release actions 
are resolved hierarchically from SecSystem to SecResource by beginning with the SecSystem set of release 
actions and combining with SecResource Type release actions, then SecResource release actions. When 
two RAs conflict at different levels, the RA at the lowest level (closest to the individual 
resource) takes precedence. The SecConsent release actions are separated from the other three 
Sec objects and are always executed as specified by the data’s owner. The consent object 
concerns data owner notifications but may also filter access to the data owner’s resources 
more strictly or release resources more freely to specific organizations and thus override 
the other three Sec objects. Within a single Sec object, each AHP contains a ranking, with 
higher ranking determining which RA is executed if there is a conflict between two RAs in 
two satisfied AHPs. 
These last aspects of the framework can be integrated through a front end into  
FHIR resources and a corresponding HAPI FHIR server implementation. The SecSystem object 
is mapped to the FHIR instance, the SecResourceType object is mapped to the FHIR resource 
type (e.g., Observation, MedicationStatement, Procedure, etc.), the SecResource object is 
mapped to the individual FHIR resource instance (e.g., a single resource instance of the 
Observation type), and the SecConsent object is mapped to the Patient whose healtchare data is 
described by the requested resource. The evaluation of the four Sec objects is resolved 
utilizing the generalized method above, by evaluating the satisfaction of the Sec objects 




type, then the SecResource for the resource, ending with the SecConsent object for the patient. The 
specified release actions for the AHP set that satisfied the Sec object are combined in this 
order and resolved via security level (FHIR server instance ranking lowest and patient 
consent ranking highest). 
5.2. Controller Configuration 
This section describes the configuration of a controller to allow for dynamic 
creation of Sec objects depending on the user’s role and resources requested in the Request 
Context (Defn. 16). Configurations are created utilizing a specialized JSON specification 
capable of defining multiple dynamic AHP sets for each role and multiple roles for each 
Sec object. The first part of a JSON schema for configuring a Sec object integrated with 
the FHIR standard is shown in Figure 5.6. Each Sec object follows the structure defined in 
the schema to express the trust profile requirements on a per role basis. The root of the 
object, shown in the top of Figure 5.6 contains the Sec object’s type identifier, which can 
take the values “system” for a SecSystem object, “type” for a SecResource Type object, “resource” for a 
SecResource object, or “consent” for a SecConsent object. The id field is dependent on the type and 
displays the appropriate ID for a System, Resource Type, Resource, or Owner. The ID for 
a system consists of the domain name of the system (e.g., bmi9.engr.uconn.edu), The ID 
for a Resource Type is the name of the Resource Type (e.g., Observation, Patient, 
MedicationStatement, etc.), the ID for a DRID is the unique numeric identifier for the 
resource, and the ID for an Owner is a unique numeric identifier for the Owner. Example 






Figure 5.6. JSON Specification for Sec Object Configuration Part 1. 
The role 1, role 2, and role n fields represent codes for the roles required for 
satisfaction of the Sec object. Each role is provided an identifier allowing easy extraction 
of the role from the config. For FHIR integration, the role codes utilize the US Core 
CareTeam Provider roles (HL7 International, 2019) compiled from the NUCC Health Care 
Provider Taxonomy Code Set (NUCC, 2020) and SNOMED CT (SNOMED International, 
2020). Each role contains a requirement object that encapsulates the requirements for the 
role. If a role is not specified by the configuration, the Sec object cannot be satisfied by 
that role. The requirements field contains three entries, the affiliation entry which is an 
instance of a property, the properties entry, which is a list of property instances, and the 
direct-consent entry, which is a list of direct-consent instances. The affiliation entry allows 
the specification of the requirements for an ACAffiliation certificate through the property object. 




one being sufficient for satisfying the Sec object. The direct-consent supports the addition 
of a trust profile identity certificate, whose proven owner automatically satisfies the 
requirements of the Sec object. 
The property field specifies the AHPs necessary for satisfaction of the Sec object, 
as well as a meta-property quantity that specifies the number of trust profile entries that 
must have those AHPs. The crud field specifies the CRUD operations (create, read, update, 
delete) that the requestor may perform if that property set is satisfied by the trust profile. 
The period field specifies a range that the trust profile entry’s timestamp must fall within 
to satisfy the Sec object. The period field allows for expression as a date range or a relative 
time, either from a specified time until the present or before a specified time. The role field 
specifies the role that the requestor must have assumed at the time of access and is specified 
as a role code from the US Core CareTeam Provider roles. The owner field specifies the 
owner of the data in the noted access was, either identified explicitly by ID, or it can have 
the value “request_id”, in which case the ID in the trust profile access must be the same as 
the ID of the owner of the resource specified in the RC. The resource-type field specifies 
the type of resource the trust profile entry must describe. For FHIR integration, this 
resource-type would describe a FHIR resource type, such as an Observation, Patient, or 
MedicationStatement. Resource-clearance and system-clearance refer to the clearances of 
the requested object matched with clearances listed in ACDataResourceConfidentiality and ACSystemConfidentiality 
certificates. The clearance listed in the trust profile must meet or exceed the clearance listed 
in the configuration to satisfy resource-clearance and system-clearance. The system-id 




release-actions field specifies a list of release actions that are performed if the Sec object 
is satisfied by that AHP set. 
A direct-consent object provides the fields necessary for uniquely identifying and 
verifying the ownership of an individual trust profile identity certificate. It contains a crud 
property for specifying the CRUD operations a requestor is allowed to perform if the 
direct-consent object is satisfied. The trust profile identity certificate is uniquely identified 
through the issuer field and the serial field. The issuer must be the string representation of 
the identity certificate issuer’s distinguished name, in the order it appears in the certificate. 
The public-key property defines a public-key object that has the properties necessary to 
parse the recorded public key. The displayed public key must use the “rsaEncryption” 
algorithm, though support for additional encryption algorithms is possible. 
Figure 5.7 shows the remainder of the JSON specification that supports the fields 
in Figure 5.6. The release-actions field provides a log object specifying the level of logging 
depending on the level of risk of releasing the requested data, which is dependent on the 
amount of trust the requestor’s trust profile credentials create. A set of strict requirements 
that generates a large amount of trust would create a low amount of risk, allowing the 
transaction to be logged as a low risk, specified with the “low” value for the log object. 
The audit field specifies whether the transaction must be accompanied by a notification to 
the local auditor, which carries either a string value representing the auditor’s email, or a 
null indicating that an immediate audit is unnecessary. The redact and modify fields are a 
list of mod-pair objects that describe how the returned resource should be redacted or 
modified by specifying individual fields and their new values. The add field specifies a list 




automatically through the client implementation. The period fields specify the period that 
the timestamp listed in the trust profile for a data access entry must fall within. Specifying 
both from and to fields with a date causes the period to evalutate the timestamp as needing 
to fall between the dates listed in the to and from fields. If the from field is null, the 
timestamp in the presented trust profile credential must be before the date listed in the to 
field inclusive. If the to field is null, the timestamp must be after the date listed in from up 
to the present time. Both fields cannot be null or the period is invalid. A date object contains 
a type field which specifies if the date is to be interpreted as “literal”, “relative”, or 
“current”. A type of “literal” indicates that the value field, specified in yyyy-MM-dd 
format, should be parsed as a yyyy-MM-dd date. A type of “relative” indicates that the 
value field should be an int, indicating that the date should be interpreted as being value 
units in the past, where the units are specified by the unit field, which may take on the 
values specified in time-value. A date type of current indicates that the Sec object should 













This chapter describes in depth the integration of trust profiles and trust negotiation 
into the Connecticut Concussion Tracker CT2 app. Trust negotiation support for the CT2 
app is implemented through the combination of four components. The first component is 
the modified CT2 mobile Android app, written in Java and supported by the Bouncy Castle 
cryptographic library, that allows for authorization to individual student concussion 
records through the trust profile. The second component is the Trust Negotiation Certificate 
Manager and GUI, which was written in Java, that manages and creates certificates and a 
certificate tree for testing, where the root consists of self-signed medical authorities, the 
internal nodes consist of CA certificates for healthcare organizations, and the leaves consist 
of identity certificates and attribute certificates that encode trust profile data. The third 
component is a trust profile supporting trust negotiation controller written in Java that: 
manages the connection with the CT2 app; oversees the validation of the trust profile 
certificates and their certificate chains; and, generates new trust profile credentials for a 
successful trust negotiation. The fourth component is a back-end certificate matching 
component that: parses the Sec object configuration; receives validated trust profile 
credentials; matches the validated credentials to the Sec object requirements; and, produces 
SGPs when the Sec objects have not been fully satisfied. These four components work with 
the existing, unmodified CT2 back-end infrastructure (database and RESTful API). 
The remainder of this chapter consists of 3 sections. Section 6.1 discusses the CT2 




shows the certificate organizer utilized to generate the initial trust profile credentials for 
the users. Section 6.3 concludes the chapter with a detailed description of the controller. 
All of the concepts discussed in Sections 6.1 to 6.3 support expected Contribution  C: 
Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies and Contribution D: Trust 
Negotiation Development Framework. 
6.1. Modified CT2 App 
The CT2 app discussed in Section 2.3, shown in Figure 6.1 has been modified to 
support trust profiles and trust negotiation when viewing a student’s concussion data. The 
initial trust profile certificates are located on the device and accessible to the CT2 app. The 
trust negotiation prototype app allows the viewing of a listing of students with concussion 
data in the remote concussion database. The CT2 app has an architecture that utilizes a 
RESTful API as the back-end, as shown in Figure 6.2 which has been adapted from (Rivera 
Sánchez, A Configurable Framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for Mobile Applications, 
2017). Notice that the architecture is back ended by the concussion database which is used 
to store the information on concussions in the bottom of Figure 6.2. The trust negotiation 
process will involve providing access to the concussion resources based on the trust profile 





Figure 6.1. The CT2 Application Screens. 
The user can retrieve the open concussion cases or search for a student by first and 
last name as shown in Screen 2 over the first row in Figure 6.1. The results list, shown in 
Screen 3 of the first row in Figure 6.1, is then used to select the student whose concussion 
data the user wishes to view. Accessing an individual concussion case will require the 
ability to access a subset of the concussion resources, which correspond to the data 
resources DR in our model. When the user selects the student’s name, the app prompts 




Figure 6.3. The app automatically creates a Request Context RC by adding the role of the 
user’s CT2 account and displays a list of trust profile certificates for the user to add to the 
trust profile tpDW, with the Data Resource DR already filled out automatically by the app 
based on the student’s concussion data previously chosen by the user. In this instance, the 
resource in the DR is the concussion record for the previously chosen student. Pressing the 
send button after choosing the trust profile certificates sends the RC to the Trust Negotiation 
Controller, to be detailed in Section 6.3. 
 
 





The Trust Negotiation Controller receives the RC from the app, processes as  
described in Section 6.3, and determines whether the certificates chosen by the user are 
sufficient to obtain access to the requested concussion data. If the tpDW from the RC is 
insufficient, the CT2 app receives an SGP from the controller. This SGP is displayed in 
Figure 6.4. The SGP provides a description to the user of the remaining unsatisfied 
requirements of the controller’s generated Sec objects allowing the user to choose trust 
profile credentials that fulfill the controller’s requirements. Once the user chooses the trust 
profile credentials and sends them to the controller, the process continues until the trust 
negotiation controller’s trust profile requirements are satisfied. Once the presented trust 
profile credentials are sufficient to satisfy the controller’s trust profile requirements, the 
controller forwards new certificates detailing access to the student’s concussion data. These 
trust profile credentials are automatically added to the user’s trust profile credentials 
located on the device and will appear in the user’s trust profile credentials listing, allowing 
those credentials to be utilized in future trust negotiation attempts. On a successful trust 
negotiation, the requested concussion data is sent to the CT2 app, which can then display 
the requested concussion data for the student as shown in Figure 6.5. If the user cannot 
supply sufficient credentials to obtain access to the requested concussion data, the 
connection to the trust negotiation server is closed and the app displays a failure message 




























6.2. Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager 
The Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager GUI is shown in Figure 6.7. The 
Certificate Manager contains three main views: the Certificate Authorities View, which 
shows all organizations capable of signing a valid certificate; the Identity Certificates View, 
which lists all X.509 identity certificates belonging to a user and signed by the highlighted 
certificate in the Certificate Authorities View; and, the Attribute Certificates View, which 
lists all the Attribute Certificates belonging to the user whose identity certificate is selected 
in the Identity Certificates View. The manager is configured to check a configured folder 
and its subfolders for the presence of certificates and organizes all of the certificates into 
an interal tree structure starting at the root, self-signed certificates down to the attribute 
certificates, where the parent of each certificate is the certificate that signed it. Attribute 
certificates are attached as children to the identity certificate they are attached to by 
issuer/serial number combination. 
The Certificate Authorities’ View displays all of the certificate authority certificates 
organized into a tree view, where the child certificates in the lower branches of the tree are 
signed by its parent certificate. All of the certificates within this view represent an authority 
like the medical authority or an organization that participates in trust profile based trust 
negotiation. When a certificate is selected in the Certificate Authorities View, the subject 
common name, issuer common name, and serial number of the certificate appear in the 
fields directly below the Certificate Authorities View. Certificate authority certificates are 
created through OpenSSL (OpenSSL Software Foundation, 2018) and must be added to 






Figure 6.7. The Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager Interface. 
The Identity Certificates View contains a listing of all of the identity certificates 
that were signed by the selected certificate in the Certificate Authorities View. These 
identity certificates are listed by the common name of the subject’s distinguished name 
field. When an identity certificate is selected, the Identity Certificates View lists the 
identity certificate’s subject common name, the identity certificate’s issuer common name, 
and the identity certificate’s serial number below the Identity certificate listing. The button 
panel at the bottom of the Identity Certificates’ View provides Create, Lock, and Delete 
buttons, adding functionality for creating and deleting identity certificates, as well as 
featuring a Lock on the Identity Certificate selection. The Lock functionality is utilized in 
Attribute Certificate selection and will be detailed during the Attribute Certificates View 




certificate in the Certificate Authorities View, a prompt appears, shown in Figure 6.8, that 
displays the distinguished name of the issuer and provides text fields to enter the 
distinguished name of the subject. Once the Create button in the prompt is pressed, the 
Certificate Manager retrieves the private key of the selected certificate authority certificate, 
signs a new identity certificate, and places it in the signed folder of the selected certificate 
authority. The delete button removes the certificate file from the file system. 
The Attribute Certificates View displays a list of all attribute certificates belonging 
to the selected certificate in the Identity Certificates View. When an Attribute Certificate 
is selected, the common name of the parent identity certificate, the common name of the 
attribute certificate issuer, and the serial number of the attribute certificate are displayed in 
the text fields below the attribute certificate listing. The buttons below the text fields feature 
Create, Edit, and Delete corresponding respectively with attribute certificate creation, 
editing, and deletion. Note that since the attribute certificate is cryptographically signed, 
editing results in deleting the old attribute certificate and creating a new attribute certificate 
with the given values. The edit screen is shown in Figure 6.9. If the ASN.1 button is 
pressed, the screen in Figure 6.10 appears showing the certificate in ASN.1 encoded form, 
which can be copied into an ASN.1 decoder to verify the contents of the attribute 
certificate. When the create button is pressed, a prompt appears with a dropdown for 
specifying which type of AC (Defns. 14a, 14b, 14c, and 14d in Chapter 4, Section 4.2) to 
create. When selected, a prompt appears with the relevant, editable fields for that type of 
certificate. Confirming the data results in the Certificate Manager creating and saving a 








Figure 6.8. The Create Identity Certificate Interface. 
 
To improve usability and ease of finding and reading certificates, the view of the 
certificate listing to the right automatically updates with a listing of child certificates when 
a certificate is selected in the certificate view to the left. For example, when a certificate is 
selected in the Certificate Authorities View, the Identity Certificates View is updated with 
a listing of all of the identity certificates signed by that certificate. Additionally, when an 




attribute certificates attached to the identity certificate. In order to simulate a controller 
with separate attribute authorities and certificate authorities, as is required by Section 4.5 
of RFC 5755 (Farrell, S et al., 2010), the Lock button functionality of the Identity 
Certificate freezes the Identity Certificate View, allowing a certificate from the Certificate 
Authority View to be selected without the current identity certificate being deselected. This 
lets a separate attribute authority certificate that hasn’t signed the identity certificate to be 
selected for attribute certificate signing. 
 
 






Figure 6.10. The ASN.1 Display. 
 
6.3. Trust Negotiation Controller 
The trust negotiation controller is written in Java, utilizing Apache Struts (The 
Apache Software Foundation, 2018) for the web interface and Bouncy Castle (Legion of 
the Bouncy Castle Inc., 2013) for certificate parsing and generation, both running on an 
Apache Tomcat (The Apache Software Foundation, 2020) server. The trust negotiation 
controller consists of two components. The first is a component that: manages the 
connection with the modified CT2 app; negotiates the release of credentials; validates the 
certificates presented by the requestor (X.509 digital signature inspection, certificate chain 
validation, and certificate revocation list checking); and, generates new credentials if trust 
negotiation is successful. The second component receives validated certificate chains, 




each of the four security levels (system, resource type, resource, and consent), and attempts 
to match the attributes for each shared certificate with the requirements it parses from the 
Sec object configurations. 
The first component operates a Struts server that receives the initial request and 
request context RC from the modified CT2 app via the RESTful Trust Negotiation API. The 
request is directed at the struts server’s /trustnegotiation/ endpoint. When the initial 
concussion request context is received, the requestor’s role, the Resource Type, the 
Resource ID, and the Patient ID are extracted. The RC is extracted and the trust negotiation 
server retrieves the user’s requested role, the DR, and the tpDW through its certificate upload 
URL. The trust negotiation server checks to make sure that the resource at the URL matches 
the requested resource in the RC and performs validation on the certificates in the tpDW 
utilizing the process discussed in Chapter 2.1 following the X.509 standard’s description 
of certificate validation. The resource request and any uploaded attribute certificates are 
then passed to the second component to begin matching the trust profile credentials 
encoded in the certificates to the security requirements in the Sec object configuration. 
The second component receives the requested role, Resource Type, Resource ID, 
and Patient ID and makes a request to the local MySQL database housing the Sec object 
configurations for the configurations needed for the current request. The SecSystem 
configuration is retrieved utilizing the local SID, in this case bmi9.engr.uconn.edu, SecResource 
Type noted in the RC , the SecResource noted in the RC, and SecConsent is retrieved from the database 
from the Patient ID in the RC. A new Sec object Java instance is created for each Sec 




that must be present to satisfy a Sec object. When it receives new certificates, the 
certificates are placed into a tree structure that groups the certificates based on the System 
S that the access took place on and by the actual access that occurred. The new certificates 
are matched against each of the AHP sets in each of the Sec object instances, being added 
to a set of certificates that records when an access for sensitive data satisfies the properties 
of a Sec object. After the new certificates have been processed, each Sec object is queried 
to produce an SGP if the certificates presented thus far have not satisfied its requirements. 
The resulting SGPs are returned to the first component, which returns the SGP to the CT2 
app, resulting in a prompt to the requestor to produce trust profile credentials that satisfy 
the SGPs. 
This process of communication and credential exchange between the CT2 app and 
the trust negotiation controller continues until each of the Sec objects are satisfied or until 
the requestor chooses to end trust negotiation without obtaining the requested data. When 
each of the Sec objects are queried for SGPs and each return a response indicating that they 
are fully satisfied, the new attribute certificates describing the access to the requested 
resource are created. The trust negotiation controller then contacts the concussion app 
backend through its RESTful API and makes a request for the data originally requested. 
The release actions for the satisifed AHPs are compiled and executed in accordance with 
Chapter 5.1.5, including logging the transactions at the levels listed in the Sec objects 
compiled through the RAs. The list of download URLs for the new certificates and the 
requested data are passed back to the CT2 app, which automatically downloads the new 
certificates to the user’s trust profile and displays the requested data to the user, as shown 






This dissertation presented and explained a method of authorization between two 
entities that have no pre-existing relationship utilizing trust negotiation (Winsborough, 
Seamons, & Jones, 2000) in conjunction with the trust profile introduced in this dissertation 
to securely exchange credentials based on the trust profile owner’s access history of 
sensitive healthcare data. A combination of ABAC (Hu, et al., 2014) to allow flexibility in 
the EHR environment for different combinations of credentials, RBAC (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, 
Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramou, 2001) to properly model current localized methods of 
access control in an EHR envornment and to inform the trust negotiation controls as to a 
proper representation of access history for the given role, and MAC (Bell & La Padula, 
1976) to implement multi-level security for the protected data were used to regulate access 
to sensitive data resources. Successful trust negotiation results in a set of new credentials 
that are passed back to the requestor, who adds those credentials to their personal trust 
profile and can be utilized in future attempts at trust negotiation. The main objectives have 
been four-fold: 1. define a set of Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among 
Organizations Participating in Trust Negotiation that allows healthcare organizations to 
trust in credentials issued by each other, even in the event the healthcare organizations do 
not personally know each other; 2. define an Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording 
Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data to document a user’s sensitive EHR 
access as a method of building trust with unknown healthcare organizations; 3. define 




to ABAC, RBAC, and MAC; and, 4. define a Trust Negotiation Development Framework 
that incorporates these contributions into the FHIR standard and our implementation of the 
CT2 app. 
The remainder of this conclusion is organized into 3 sections. Section 7.1 
summarizes this dissertation while highlighting the four main objectives detailed above. 
Section 7.2 builds on this by discussing the four research contributions of this dissertation: 
Contribution A: Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations 
Participating in Trust Negotiation; Contribution B: Integrated Trust Profile Model for 
Recording Complete Records of User Access to Sensitive Data; Contribution C: 
Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies; and, Contribution D: Trust 
Negotiation Development Framework. In Section 7.3, we discuss ongoing research and 
identify future directions for trust profile based trust negotiation including but not limited 
to: framework extensions that streamline the trust negotiation process, demonstration of 
our approach in other domains, further integration of the trust negotiation framework with 
FHIR, improvements to the trust profile requirements specification, framework 
deployment improvements, and a formal security evaluation of trust profile based trust 
negotiation. 
7.1. Summary 
The research presented in this dissertation works to create a trust profile based on 
a user’s access history to sensitive data resources as a new means of obtaining authorization 
to similar sensitive data resources, without the need for the user or the remote controller to 
have a pre-existing relationship. The main focus of the dissertation was to create an 




remote controller to infer trustworthiness in handling future sensitive data resources by: 
generating a series of trust profile requirements for the user, communicating the 
requirements to the user, negotiating the release of trust profile credentials that fulfill the 
requirements, matching the presented credentials to the requirements, and generating new 
credentials when the requirements are fulfilled. The discussion of this process was 
presented throughout six chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduced the main research areas and provided a high level overview 
for enhancement of existing authorization models with trust negotiation and trust profiles. 
Section 1.1 discussed the motivation for trust profiles and trust negotiation from a 
healthcare perspective, describing the state of healthcare security and the issues within 
healthcare that demand new forms of dynamic authorization to sensitive healthcare data. 
Section 1.2 discussed the motiviation for trust profiles and the potential applications of 
trust profiling to enable dynamic authorization between two arbitrary parties with no pre-
existing relationship. Section 1.3 explained a high level overview of our approach to 
integrate trust profiles and trust negotiation into an authorization solution. Section 1.4 
provided a listing of the research objectives and the expected contributions of this 
dissertation. Section 1.5 discussed the published works written in support of the research 
discussed in this dissertation. Section 1.6 concludes the chapter with an outline concerning 
the structure of the remainder of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 provided necessary background on concepts utilized in the construction 
of our approach to creating a trust profile based trust negotiation authorization framework 
throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Section 2.1 discussed the current state of trust 




integration of trust profiles and trust negotiation into the healthcare setting. Section 2.2 
described access control models commonly utilized in current authorization techniques and 
the manner in which we integrate them into our work. Section 2.3 provided an overview of 
the Fast Healthcare Interoperabilty Resources (FHIR) standard and the HAPI FHIR Java 
implementation of the standard in support of the proof of concept prototype discussed in 
Chapter 6. Section 2.4 discussed the Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) app, a 
collaboration between the Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer 
Science & Engineering at the University of Connecticut and the Schools of Nursing and 
Medicine, which provided a testbed for our prototype in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 3 presented the infrastructure requirements for trust negotiation that create 
a network of trust between systems participating in trust negotiation via a set of identity 
and attribute certificates that encode trust profile data. Section 3.1 began the chapter with 
a discussion of identity and attribute certificates, their formats, and their useage defined in 
the X.509 standard. Section 3.2 gave background on the basic trust negotiation process, 
including: credential exchange, certificate validation, and credential expression generation; 
and, provides an example of trust negotiation from a healthcare perspective. Section 3.3 
introduced the trust profile certificate infrastructure that allows trust profile credentials 
encoded in the identity and attribute certificates to be shared and trusted among all systems 
participating in trust negotiation. Section 3.4 described the structure of a controller that 
receives trust negotiation requests, generates requirements for the user’s presented trust 
profile, guards access to sensitive healthcare data, and generates new trust profile 




Chapter 4 presented a detailed description of a formal model for trust profiles and 
integration of trust profiles with adaptive trust negotiation. Section 4.1 introduces the trust 
profile concept and combines it with the identity and attribute certificate concepts 
introduced in Section 3.1, as well as introducing the new trust profile credential generation 
process. Section 4.2 introduces a detailed model and definitions for trust profile structure 
and controller interaction, including definitions for: the user, controller, and resources; the 
encoding of entries in the trust profile’s X.509 identity and attribute certificates; and, the 
trust negotiation interactions between the users and controllers during the trust negotiation 
process. Section 4.3 ties together the trust profile definitions by providing a detailed 
example utilizing the healthcare field that describes the interactions between the user and 
controller, the process of utilizing the trust profile to obtain access to sensitive resources, 
and obtaining new trust profile credentials. Section 4.4 describes related work to trust 
negotiation and compares it to our new implementation. 
Chapter 5 introduced the trust negotiation development framework by providing: a 
controller infrastructure for applying security metadata to resources at multiple levels, a 
method for defining trust profile requirements, and a method for combining the multi-level 
security metadata into an access control decision. Section 5.1 explained the Sec object 
concept that parses a configuration for its level, matches incoming trust profile credentials 
to the security requirements the configuration represents, and decides whether the 
presented trust profile credentials are sufficient to allow access to its level of security. 
Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4 introduced the four types of Sec objects and the security levels: the 
system level that protects all resources of a system, the resource type level that protects all 




consent level that allows the data’s owner to set security requirements on the data. Section 
5.1.5 provided a method for combining the requirements of the four types of Sec objects to 
decide whether access to the requested resource is allowed. Section 5.2 detailed the JSON 
schema of a configuration and provided example configurations for the four types of Sec 
objects. 
Chapter 6 discussed the prototype trust profile supporting trust negotiation 
framework incorporated into the existing Connecticut Concussion Tracker CT2 app. 
Section 6.1 discussed the modifications made to the CT2 app to support authorization to 
concussion data via trust profile based trust negotiation and pictured the app with 
concussion data and the additional screens that support trust negotiation. Section 6.2 
showed the Trust Negotiation Certificate Manager that manages the manual creation of 
certificates for certificate authorities and a user’s initial trust profile certificates. Section 
6.3 detailed the Trust Negotiation Controller that: provides the communication point for 
trust negotiation between the CT2 app and the concussion data, validates certificates, 
provides the Sec object creation and credential matching capabilities, decides whether 
access to the data is allowed, and generates new trust profile certificates and retrieves the 
requested data on a successful trust negotiation attempt. 
7.2. Research Contributions 
This section revisits the expected research contributions presented in Section 1.4 of 
Chapter 1 and describes how each was attained throughout the chapters of this dissertation. 





A. Infrastructure Requirements to Promote Trust Among Organizations 
Participating in Trust Negotiation: This contribution specified a structure 
for disseminating trust among the trust negotiation participants, displayed 
in the left side of Figure 1.1 of Chapter 1 and represented by the Trust 
Building process in Figure 1.2 of Chapter 1. This contribution allows trust 
in the trust profile certificates to be established through the given 
application of the X.509 standard, allowing the utilization of a decentralized 
network structure, increasing fault tolerance and efficiency. Chapter 3 
supports this contribution by providing a network structure (shown in 
Figure 3.3), controller structure (shown in Figure 3.4), and providing a 
detailed description of the trust profile certificate infrastructure (Section 
3.3). 
B. Integrated Trust Profile Model for Recording Complete Records of 
User Access to Sensitive Data: This contribution presented a formal model 
for the completion of a trust negotiation process utilizing trust profile 
credentials, displayed in the Trust Negotiation level of Figure 1.2 and 
represented in Figure 1.1 by the Identity Certificates, Attribute Certificates, 
and Trust Profile on the left side and the process of exchange between the 
User Trust Agent and the Controller Trust Agent. Chapters 3 and 4 
supported this contribution. Chapter 3 supported this contribution through 
an overview of the trust negotiation process and description of the controller 
structure. Chapter 4 supported this contribution by providing formal 




(Defns. 1-3 in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4), the structure of trust profiles 
(Defns. 8-15 in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4), and the interactions of the 
requestor and controller (Defns. 4-7, 16-21 in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4). 
This allowed the creation of a trust profile and methods for negotiating the 
release of sensitive data. 
C. Dynamically Generated Adaptive Access Control Policies: This 
contribution incorporates access control models into the trust negotiation 
process by allowing the requested resources to be annotated with security 
metadata and allowing the controller to utilize that security metadata to 
make a decision regarding access, represented in Figure 1.2 by the Security 
Policies level and the Access Control Policies on the right side of Figure 
1.1. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 supported this contribution by defining the 
integration of access control policies into attribute certificates, the trust 
profile, and the controller respectively. Chapter 6 supported this 
contribution by describing a controller implementation that supports the 
dynamic access control policies. This contribution allows the integration of 
common access control models into trust negotiation. 
D. Trust Negotiation Development Framework: This contribution defines a 
process for combining Contributions A, B, and C into a coherent whole that 
provides a unified framework capable of performing trust based trust 
negotiation. Chapters 5 and 6 supported this contribution by creating a 
controller definition that dynamically generates access control policies and 




dissertation. This contribution allows the easy deployment of a trust 
negotiation network that incorporates trust profiles as credentials. 
 
7.3. Ongoing and Future Work 
This dissertation presents research that has potential for future improvements and 
extensions to our work on adaptive trust negotiation. A list of ongoing and future topics 
includes: an extension to the framework in order to model batch processing of resource 
requests and the ability to delegate trust profile credentials; demonstrating the adaptive, 
trust profile based trust negotiation framework in other domains; exploring the integration 
of the trust negotiation framework concepts directly into FHIR resources by leveraging the 
profile extension; improving communication of requirements and dissemination of 
credentials through the improvement of the configuration specification, SGPs, and 
providing automatic fulfillment of the provided SGP by the requestor’s trust agent; 
improving the trust negotiation framework’s deployment by streamlining the trust 
negotiation framework’s setup through standardized trust profile credential storage and 
docker container deployment; and, performing a formal security evaluation of the 
presented trust profile based trust negotiation framework. 
Framework Extensions: The framework currently does not efficiently handle 
transactions that require the retrieval of multiple resources in a batch format. This is 
apparent for students that may have multiple concussion records in the prototype, or if trust 
negotiation is enabled, to retrieve the initial listing of students as under FHIR each student 
would be listed in a separate Patient resource returned as a bundle. Future work could result 




differing types in one transaction. Delegation of trust profile entries is another feature that 
could be added to the framework to enable secure delegation of trust profile credentials, 
which would allow others to assist in the requesting of sensitive data (e.g., an assistant 
retrieving healthcare records a physician will need for an appointment). Future work could 
implement this by creating a method for temporary delegation of a subset of a user’s trust 
profile to another user, allowing a user to securely obtain access to data on behalf of 
another. 
Demonstration of Trust Profiles, Sec Objects, and Controllers in Other 
Domains: Trust negotiation and trust profiles have applications to domains other than 
healthcare where a dynamic coalition of multiple specialists have an unforseen need to 
share secure data. The dynamic sharing of sensitive criminal investigation data among 
multiple jurisdictions in the legal community could lead to increased cooperation among 
law enforcement and increased arrests when crimes are committed in multiple jurisdictions. 
The financial industry is also an applicable domain, as shown by an online purchase trust 
negotiation implementation (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, & Seamons, 2005) that 
utilizes transaction history. The future work considers a methodology for the adaptation of 
trust profiles and trust negotiations to any domain. 
Integration of Trust Negotiation Framework with FHIR: The Sec object 
configurations in the prototype are hosted in a separate database instance and are retrieved 
through concussion identifiers by the controller when the request is first received. The 
profile extension is a potential method for embedding a resource’s requirements directly 
into the resource itself. The resources would be able to retrieve multiple Sec objects in one 




also allow easy updating of the Sec objects and through the FHIR interface. Additionally, 
the Security Labels through extensions are another resource provided by FHIR that allows 
the embedding of access control data, which has the potential to provide additional security 
data and the potential enhancement of the Release Actions. 
Communication of Requirements: While versatile and expressive, the current 
configuration schema for representing Sec object requirements could be improved to 
reduce redundancy when multiple AHP property sets share similar but not completely 
overlapping requirements. The improvement could take the form of a property set specified 
in the properties array itself behaving as a tree where the nodes closer to the roots represent 
common requirements among its subbranches, and their children represent unique 
divergences in the trust profile requirements relative to their parents. Additionally, the SGP 
requirements could be streamlined in the same manner and described to the user in a more 
intuitive display than the example provided in Chapter 6 in Figure 6.4, where the SGP 
JSON is printed directly to the screen. Finally, since a trust profile can grow arbitrarily 
large over the course of a user’s entire career, the app could automatically retrieve the 
proper credentials to fulfill the SGP, only asking the user for confirmation before sending 
the credentials back to the controller. 
Trust Negotiation Framework Deployment Improvements: The deployment of 
the Trust Negotiation Framework could be improved by making a configurable docker 
container available that can be run as an easy method for adding trust negotiation to a server 
housing sensitive data. Through proper docker configuration, a new trust negotiation URL 
could be implemented that can be connected to through a RESTful API, where the 




trust profile deployment to mobile devices could be improved by properly handling cases 
where multiple people may need to share the same device, such as in a healthcare setting 
where separate, security hardened devices may be shared among healthcare employees. In 
this case, it must be easy for the user to retrieve and use the private keys of their own trust 
profile, while making it impossible for a user to access the private keys of another user’s 
trust profile. 
Formal Security Evaluation: The current implementation of trust profile based 
trust negotiation lacks a formal security evaluation of its parts and operation that is capable 
of providing a list of guarantees regarding the usage of trust profiles in both successful and 
unsuccessful situations. Performing a formal security evaluation of the presented trust 
profile based trust negotiation framework, as well as the presented CT2 app prototype, 
would offer data on possible vulnerabilities that could occur in a potential full deployment 
of a trust profile based trust negotiation implementation over a large network. This 
information is useful to medical authorities, whose expertise is necessary to build trust 
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